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I. INTRODUCTION
A consumer living in Ohio, using a credit card, purchases an expensive leather
purse from a company based in Milan, Italy. In order to access the website,
she must click on the electronic agreement, which she does without reading
the terms. The purse that is delivered is of inferior quality to that which was
described on the website. When the consumer contacts the Italian company,
she is informed that the click agreement requires that all disputes be handled
by arbitration in Milan.
A stay-at-home mom decides to open a business selling handmade soaps over
the Internet. Her lawyer advises her that she should incorporate her business
in order to protect her personal assets. She contacts a bank about setting up a
merchant account in order to process credit cards electronically. The repre-
sentative for the bank informs her that the fee for credit card purchases will
be 3.5% of the total monthly charges and faxes an application to her. The
mom/entrepreneur glances at the application, notes that the commission
amount is accurate, and signs where indicated. She does not have the money
to have a lawyer review the agreement. Unknowingly, she has executed a
guaranty that makes her personally liable for her company's obligations.
A Korean-born business owner discusses renting retail space for a video rental
store from a Russian-born property owner. Due to a miscommunication, the
business owner believes that maintenance costs will be included in the
monthly rental. The agreement is delivered by the property owner and the
business owner signs it, anxious to start construction on the space. Six
months after the agreement is executed, the business owner receives a bill for
maintenance costs in the amount of $5,000.
This Article argues that rapid societal changes require a theory of
contract that is capable of evolving with them and urges adoption of a
"dynamic" approach to contract disputes.1 In his essay, The Emer-
gence of Dynamic Contract Law, Melvin Eisenberg states that princi-
1. The evolving nature of science and human relationships also underscores the
need for dynamic contract law as evidenced by the state of judicial decisions gov-
erning reproductive technology and surrogate parenthood. These issues raise a
host of relevant and interesting issues that may be informed by this Article but
are not the subject of it.
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ples of dynamic contract law do not depend "solely on what occurred at
the moment in time when a contract was formed, but instead turn on
the moving stream of events that precedes, follows, or constitutes the
formation of a contract."2 By contrast, contract law principles are
"static" if their "application turns entirely on what occurred at the mo-
ment in time when a contract was formed."3 Although Eisenberg de-
fines "dynamic" in relation to the time of contract formation, I use the
term here to reflect his larger thesis that contract law should, where
appropriate, be "individualized rather than standardized, subjective
rather than objective, complex rather than binary, and dynamic
rather than static."4 In other words, dynamic contract law strives to
establish the "best possible rules"5 rather than hewing to formalistic
principles. It views the contract not as a written text frozen in time
with two purely rational actors as parties, but as an exchange of words
and acts between two individuals with varying experiences, against a
backdrop of changing circumstances.
Unfortunately, while many modern contractual disputes develop
from a myriad of factors, contract law, which focuses on interpreta-
tion, 6 adopts a unitary approach to addressing such disputes. This
emphasis on contract interpretation is likely derived from classical
contract law, which adopted an objective theory of contract interpreta-
tion despite its proclamation that contract formation required a meet-
ing of the minds.7 Thus, the issue of what the parties subjectively
intended was subordinate to the issue of what was reasonable to pre-
sume based upon their overt acts.8
While modern contract law strives to effectuate the understanding
of the parties, the focal point of judicial inquiry continues to be the
interpretation of the contract's written words, rather than the parties'
subjective state of mind. The interpretation of the writing, word(s), or
clause(s) usually proves determinative in the enforceability of the con-
2. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1743, 1762 (2000).
3. Id. at 1748.
4. Id. at 1745. Similarly, the term "static" is used in a broader sense, to refer to a
formalistic, standardized application of a rule which focuses solely on the time of
contract formation.
5. Id.
6. Avery Weiner Katz, Essay, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract
Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004) ("Under the modern American law
of contracts, almost all applications of legal doctrine turn on questions of inter-
pretation ... " (quoting Woburn Nat'l Bank v. Woods, 89 A. 491, 492 (N.H.
1914))).
7. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1756 ("A contract involved what is called a meeting of
the minds of the parties. But this does not mean that they must have arrived at a
common mental state touching the matter in hand. The standard by which their
conduct is judged and their rights are limited is not internal, but external.").
8. Id.
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tract, the obligation of the parties, and the amount and type of dam-
ages available. Contract law sets forth many rules of contract
interpretation or "default" rules to address contractual disputes. For
example, the plain meaning rule requires that if the disputed writing
or word "appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning
must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without
resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature."9 Yet, where a party is una-
ware of this interpretation or default rule, the use of the rule may
defeat or contradict that party's contractual intent. This Article fur-
ther argues that, in many cases, these numerous rules of interpreta-
tion work to the disadvantage of the party with fewer resources,
particularly when that party is a member of a cultural or language
minority.1 0 Traditionally, contract doctrine assumes that contracting
parties are equals-that they are equally situated economically, expe-
rientially, and ethically-when entering into a contract. In reality, in-
dividuals entering into a contract have varying degrees of experience
and bargaining power that affects their understandings of the nature
of their contractual relationship. Cultural and linguistic factors may
also play a role in each party's interpretation of the contract.
The interplay of interpretation rules with standard forms raises
additional issues of fairness that may disproportionately affect al-
ready disadvantaged parties. Strict adherence to interpretation rules
where the agreement is a form with standardized terms also under-
mines the three oft-cited objectives of contract law-autonomy, eco-
nomic efficiency, and fairness. All three of these objectives involve
both individual and societal interests. While the parties to a contract
may be furthering their individual desires, they are also engaging in
an act that has repercussions for third parties and the larger society.
In particular, where the contracting parties are commercial entities
and not individuals, there may be very little self-actualization at stake
but significant economic implications affecting nonparties to the
transaction. For example, a contract for the sale of software between
two commercial entities should be enforced not because it enhances
the will of living, breathing parties (as the entities are legal fictions),
but because it affects the economic interests of living, breathing non-
parties (such as the salesperson expecting a commission and the tech-
nology officer responsible for ordering the software) and stimulates
commerce.
Melvin Eisenberg notes that the twentieth century has already
witnessed the emergence of dynamic contract law although, as dis-
cussed in this Article, the adoption and advocacy of dynamic contract
9. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-10, at
166-67 (3d ed. 1987).
10. This Article uses the term "cultural" broadly to include commercial, social, ethnic,
and racial contexts.
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principles by courts and scholars is neither uniform nor widespread.
This Article proposes that adoption of dynamic principles furthers the
primary objectives of contract law and is best suited to address evolv-
ing social norms and needs. By setting as the primary objective ascer-
tainment of the parties' intent rather than review of words on a page,
a dynamic approach better captures the context and the spirit in
which the contract was made. Part II briefly summarizes the most
commonly cited objectives of contract law and discusses why a dy-
namic approach to contract law is preferable to strict adherence to any
one theory. Part III examines why and how contract rules of interpre-
tation may undermine the objectives of contract law discussed in Part
II and discusses why a dynamic application of contract rules of inter-
pretation best accommodates evolving business and societal needs and
the traditional objectives of contract law. Part IV examines three
cases and proposes how the analysis might differ using a dynamic ap-
proach. This Part concludes that the threshold question of whether to
apply a particular interpretation rule should depend upon whether it
is helpful in determining the intent of the parties or in promoting a
policy or legislative objective. This Part also provides guidelines re-
garding how and when to apply contract interpretation rules using a
dynamic approach.
II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONTRACT LAW THEORIES
Although there are various articulated objectives of contract law,
this Part considers the three most acknowledged and often-cited:11
furtherance of individual autonomy; encouraging promissory ex-
changes; and promoting fairness or redistributive justice.12 This Part
then discusses a dynamic theory of contracts and its broader capacity
for accommodating the various goals of contract law.
A. The Individual Autonomy Theory or "Furthering the Will
of the Parties"
Many theories of contract law arise from the belief that humans
are free and rational beings 13 and that contracting should facilitate
11. In this Part, I am performing the purely descriptive function of summarizing and
distilling the most oft-cited reasons for enforcing contracts, not advocating any
one policy or objective.
12. See William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in
the Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 931, 947 (2001); Emily
L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253,
272-73 (1991); Richard E. Speidel, Book Review, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 255, 257
(2000) (reviewing E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF
REGRETTED DECISIONS (1998)).
13. See generally RoscoE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
143-49 (1954) ("The decisive element in seventeenth-century thought as to con-
tract was the idea of natural law; the idea of deduction from the nature of man as
[Vol. 84:506
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the power of self-governing parties. 14 Derived from classic liberalism,
individual autonomy or "will theorists" emphasize self-determination
and freedom of contract.15 Thus, individuals should be free to engage
in promissory exchanges with minimal government interference.
Promises are expressions of individual will and, as such, are the
source of the parties' obligations. 16 Parties may promise anything
that is not illegal and are obligated only to perform what they have
promised. 17 Even among will theorists, there are differences. Charles
Fried, for example, states that a contract is a moral obligation and
should be legally enforceable in order to foster mutual trust and coop-
eration to facilitate individual pursuits.' 8 Randy Barnett, on the
other hand, has promoted the view that contracts should be enforced
a moral creature and of legal rules and legal institutions which expressed this
ideal of human nature .... Later metaphysical jurists rely upon the idea of per-
sonality. The Romanist thinks of a legal transaction as a willing of some change
in a person's sphere of rights to which the law, carrying out his will, gives the
intended effect .... Later in the nineteenth century men came to think more
about freedom of contract than about enforcement of promises when made. To
Spencer and the mechanical positivists conceiving of law negatively as a system
of hands off while men do things, rather than as a system of ordering to prevent
friction and waste so that they may do things, the important institution was a
right of free exchange and free contract, deduced from the law of equal freedom as
a sort of freedom of economic motion and locomotion. Justice required that each
individual be at liberty to make free use of his natural powers in bargains and
exchanges and promises except as he interfered with like action on the part of his
fellow men, or with some other of their natural rights.").
14. Friedrich Kessler, Introduction: Contract as a Principle of Order, in FRIEDRICH
KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY M. KnoNmAN, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1986),
reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 4-12 (Peter Linzer ed., 4th ed. 1992);
POUND, supra note 13, at 149.
15. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
5-6 (1981) ("I begin with a statement of the central conception of contract as
promise. This is my version of the classical view of contract proposed by the will
theory and implicit in the assertion that contract offers a distinct and compelling
ground of obligation .... I propose to perennial conundrums solutions that accord
with the idea of contract as promise and with decency and common sense as
well."). But cf. P. S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 3-4 (1986) ("[M]y view is that
the great storehouse of legal decisions concerning contractual obligations ....
illustrates that at no time in our legal history has a bare promise been regarded,
without more, as sufficient to create a legal obligation; and furthermore, this lim-
itation on legal effectiveness is itself largely based on moral considerations ....
[Ilt is quite impossible to affirm that all promises ought to create moral or social
obligations, without any regard to the reasons for the making of the promise, or
the consequences which have ensued from its being made.").
16. James Gordley, Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAw 265, 267 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
17. Id.
18. FRIED, supra note 15, at 57 ("The moral force behind contract as promise is auton-
omy: the parties are bound to their contract because they have chosen to be.").
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because the parties have consented to be legally bound.19 These sub-
sets or offshoots of the "individual autonomy" or "furthering the indi-
vidual will of the parties" theory of contract law2 0 believe that a
promisor is bound because the promisor willed to be bound.21
Under autonomy theories, a defendant in a breach of contract case
may raise a defense if she did not voluntarily assent to the agree-
ment.22 This is because promises induced by fraud or mistake are not
expressions of will and therefore lack moral foundation. 2 3 Cognitive
and informational gaps may also affect autonomous decision-making 24
and provide a basis for rescission. 25 In general, however, such gaps
must result from some sort of deception on the part of the plaintiff2 6 or
a legal condition (such as mental incapacity or minor status) that jus-
tifies intervention by the courts. Generally, lack of sophistication or
bad judgment provides no defense to otherwise valid contracts. 2 7
19. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV. 627,
634-35 (2002) [hereinafter Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts] ("Suppose
that the enforcement of private agreements is not about promising, but about
manifesting consent to be legally bound. Suppose the reason why we enforce cer-
tain commitments, whether or not in the form of a promise, is because one party
has manifested its consent to be legally bound to perform that commitment. Ac-
cording to this theory, the assent that is critical to the issue of formation or en-
forceability is not the assent to perform or refrain from performing a certain act-
the promise-but the manifested assent to be legally bound to do so."); see also
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986);
Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1022 (1992).
20. Anthony R. Chase notes, however, that the notion of free will and individual au-
tonomy on the part of contracting parties was often based upon a fiction:
The problem with classical contract law was that its foundation rested
on the essential premise that contracts were entered into voluntarily by
free individuals who were equal to each other. Differences in socioeco-
nomic class or distribution of wealth were irrelevant .... [T]he law of
contracts created the illusion that all men were free to enter or not enter
into contracts as they chose. However, the reality was that the law of
contracts during the Industrial Revolution enabled the industrialists to
control the working class, who either accepted the wages offered and
hours demanded or starved.
Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1995).
21. Gordley, supra note 16, at 267.
22. Sherwin, supra note 12, at 270-71.
23. Id.
24. Id. ("To the extent that choices are distorted... some forms of paternalistic inter-
vention in private exchange may serve to protect rather than inhibit the personal
autonomy of the parties.").
25. For a critical analysis of Fried's treatment of rescission, see Richard Craswell,
Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV.
489, 520-21 (1989).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151-58 (1981).
27. Sherwin, supra note 12, at 271; see also CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES
103-04 (1970). But see Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Con-
[Vol. 84:506
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B. Economic Theories of Contracts
Another commonly stated objective of contract law is to encourage
promissory exchanges. Underlying this objective is the belief that
such exchanges are beneficial to the economy. 28 The reliability of
promises encourages promissory exchanges. 29 Ensuring the security
of transactions 3 0 serves the broader society by enhancing trust and
facilitating transactions, 3 1 which benefit a credit economy. Closely re-
lated to and corresponding to this utilitarian view of the function of
contracts are theories that examine contracts in terms of wealth max-
imization.3 2 One of the most visible and influential proponents of the
law and economics philosophy, 3 3 Richard Posner, 34 views contracts as
tracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 797 (1983) ("The will-based theories of obligation that
dominate the intellectual scene today obscure the complexity of our law of con-
tracts by putting before us a wholly denatured conception of the person in which
passion and moral imagination have no place. Whatever in our law of contracts
is centrally concerned with these matters has, as a result, become mysterious and
been brought under suspicion from a moral point of view. The rediscovery of
judgment as a topic of interest and importance would be a step in the other
direction.").
28. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINsKy, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS
(1983); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Con-
tract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986).
29. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 1.2-1.3 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS]; POUND, supra note 13, at 133-34.
30. POUND, supra note 13, at 133-34 ("[Mien must be able to assume that those with
whom they deal in the general intercourse of the society will act in good faith, and
as a corollary must be able to assume that those with whom they so deal will
carry out their undertakings according to the expectations which the moral senti-
ment of the community attaches thereto. Hence in a commercial and industrial
society, a claim or want or demand of society that promises be kept and that
undertakings be carried out in good faith, a social interest in the stability of
promises as a social and economic institution, becomes of the first importance.
This social interest in the security of transactions, as one might call it, requires
that we secure the individual interest of the promise that is, his claim or demand
to be assured in the expectation created, which has become part of his
substance.").
31. See generally Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in
THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 19 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Gordley, supra note
16, at 294 (considering, for example, the importance of the "virtues of prudence,
temperance, fortitude, and justice" in contracting).
32. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 356-57 (1990)
("'[W]ealth maximization' [is a] term often misunderstood. The 'wealth' in
'wealth maximization' refers to the sum of all tangible and intangible goods and
services, weighted by prices of two sorts: offer prices (what people are willing to
pay for goods they do not already own); and asking prices (what people demand to
sell what they do own) .... The fallacy ... lies in equating business income to
social wealth."); see also POLINKSY, supra note 28, at 10 (discussing standard as-
sumptions of economic analysis, including consumer sovereignty, exogenous pref-
erences, and utility maximization).
33. For criticisms of the law and economics movements, see generally ATIYAH, supra
note 15, at 150-78. Atiyah explains:
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efficient vehicles for allocation of resources because parties would not
agree to an exchange unless each party believed that she would be
better off as a result.3 5 Contract law should reduce the costs of prom-
issory exchanges by encouraging performance through the use of sanc-
tions for breach. 3 6
Not surprisingly, law and economic theorists tend to disfavor con-
tract defenses based upon equitable principles, particularly those
based on hardship and unfairness. 37 Such defenses leave a contract
vulnerable to judicial inquiry into the substance of the bargain, under-
mining the principle that contracting parties are in the best position
to determine the value of a given good or service. Certain contract
defenses, however, may provide a useful economic function. For ex-
ample, fraud and duress defenses may be used to deter conduct that
would otherwise diminish trust and, consequently, reduce willingness
to enter into contracts.38 In general, however, economic theorists dis-
approve of contract defenses in all but a few, narrowly defined cases. 39
C. Distributive Justice or Achieving Fairness
In addition to the objectives of promoting individual autonomy and
ensuring the security of transactions, contract law strives to achieve
fairness and equity. Typically parties do not enter into contracts with
the primary purpose of achieving social justice, the usual forum in-
One of the most curious phenomena of the law-and-economics theorists
represented especially by Richard Posner (but with many followers) is
the way in which they are so often able to demonstrate that "the common
law" is efficient in its result though its reasoning may be awry ....
[w]hat do these economists mean by the "common law"?... Much of [the
law and economics literature] seems over-simplified to the point of
unreality.
Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement,
42 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1990).
34. For a critical analysis of Posner's work, see Mark M. Hager, The Emperor's
Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner's Jurisprudence of Class, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 7
(1991).
35. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW
1-2 (1979). Critics have argued that an individual may fail to maximize wealth
due to cognitive errors or because she has other interests, such as fairness. See,
e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Law and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541, 550 (2003).
36. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35, at 4-5.
37. Sherwin, supra note 12, at 269.
38. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAWS §§ 4.6-4.7 (3d ed. 1986); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293,
298 (1975) (discussing fraudulent misrepresentation as a defense to a contract
suit).
39. See POSNER, supra note 38, § 4.7 ("Economic analysis reveals no ground other
than fraud, incapacity and duress (the last narrowly defined) for allowing a party
to repudiate the bargain. .. ").
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stead being the courts or the legislature. 4 0 However, while parties
may not enter into contracts with the end goal of promoting fairness or
equity, most contracting parties expect to be treated fairly and equita-
bly. Various doctrines are intended to protect individuals from con-
tracts that are unfair or inequitable, even if the traditional elements
of an enforceable contract-such as offer and acceptance, considera-
tion, and specificity of terms-are present. For example, contract law
has traditionally allowed a party to void an agreement based upon
lack of mental capacity.
The notion of fairness becomes especially relevant when there are
disparities in the information or resources available to the contracting
parties. 4 1 These disparities are particularly common where form
agreements are involved, as further discussed in subsection III.A.2.b.
Redistribution of wealth, usually accomplished through legislation,4 2
is sometimes judicially achieved through contract interpretation.43
Interpretive issues that are defined as factual may be sent to juries,
which have a well-deserved reputation for favoring Davids over
Goliaths.44 Not surprisingly, many form agreements now include ex-
press language that the parties shall resolve any disputes through ar-
bitration4 5 to avoid allowing an interpretive issue before a jury.
Defenses relying upon the concept of fairness46 permit judges to
rectify situations on an individualized basis that might otherwise fail
to meet the requirements of a legal defense. Such judicial scrutiny,
however, leaves the defendant vulnerable to questions regarding her
competence in making important decisions. While such paternalism
40. But see Julian S. Lim, Comment, Tongue-Tied in the Market: The Relevance of
Contract Law to Racial-Language Minorities, 91 CAL. L. REV. 579, 585 (2003)
("[A] predominant part of the agenda of this Comment is to dispute the persistent
notion that contract law is separate from social and fairness issues, and is inde-
pendent of social factors such as race.").
41. Whitford, supra note 12, at 953.
42. For example, the Consumer Protection for New Californians bill requires certain
California businesses that negotiate in four major Asian languages to have con-
tracts written in those languages. S. AB 309, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2003).
43. Whitford, supra note 12, at 954 ("[O]ne way to counteract undue advantage
gained through contract is simply to interpret contracts consistently with sub-
stantive justice, regardless of the words used in the writing. It is no news that
there is a long history of such interpretations.").
44. Id.
45. The following is an example of arbitration language: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided for in this Agreement, any claim, dispute or controversy arising between
the parties out of or in relation to this Agreement, or breach thereof, which can-
not be satisfactorily settled by the parties, shall be finally settled by arbitration
upon the written request of either party, in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association."
46. While the notion of fairness permeates legal defenses, it provides the basis for
equitable defenses. See generally Sherwin, supra note 12, at 273-74.
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may be a lesser evil than the enforcement of an oppressive agreement,
it may have other unintended, negative effects. For example, some
critics have argued that the doctrine of unconscionability, discussed in
subsection III.B.1, may reinforce negative stereotypes of
African-Americans .47
D. A Dynamic Theory of Contract Law
Many commentators have written about the lack of a complete the-
ory of contracts. 48 The proffered reasons for this absence are varied,
including the variety of contract types to be covered,49 the confusion
wrought by the sheer number of contract theories,50 and the courts'
general disinterest in academic scholarship.51 Into this fray, I throw
one more possibility, which is that in order for contract theory to have
practical applicability, it must reflect and address evolving social
norms and needs. Classical law was structured by dichotomies, the
most fundamental being between the individual and the state.5 2
Much existing contract doctrine reflects this dichotomy, viewing the
promissory exchange either as an individual right or as a matter of
public policy, binding because the court determined it served social
needs. 53 In reality, however, a contract involves both individual and
societal interests and any given theory of contract should examine
both, rather than explain why one should always prevail over the
47. See Chase, supra note 20; see also Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 89 (1993) (dis-
cussing the difficulties of teaching this landmark unconscionability case). But see
Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussions of Contract
Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 934 (1997) (stating that to ignore that stereotypes
and prejudices based on race that may affect the contracting process "relegates
race and gender as irrelevant, misplaced" and "[t]he failure to consider the possi-
ble effect of negative stereotypes and prejudices upon the advantaged party un-
derscores the deficiencies of the unconscionability doctrine").
48. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L.
REV. 103 (1988); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J.
1417, 141 (2004) (arguing that "individualistic theories do not capture or reflect
the distinctive moral center of promise and contract"); Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 35, at 543; see also generally P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT (1974); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
49. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35, at 543 ("Contract law has neither a complete
descriptive theory, explaining what the law is, nor a complete normative theory,
explaining what the law should be. These gaps are unsurprising given the tradi-
tional definition of contract as embracing all promises that the law will enforce.").
50. See Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283
(1990).
51. E. Allan Farnsworth, Essay, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's:
The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 225 (1990) ("Viewed from the
academe, the most significant non-event of the decade was the failure of contract
theory to have a significant impact on practice.").
52. Feinman, supra note 50, at 1286.
53. Id. at 1286-87.
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other. Instead of establishing principles to support a given doctrine or
theory, contract law should explain, establish, and uphold rules of be-
havior.54 In other words, it should be adaptive, complex, substantive,
and dynamic, rather than stringent, binary, formalistic, and static.5 5
Melvin Eisenberg sets forth the principles of dynamic contract
law5 6 as follows:
First, but only if appropriate conditions are satisfied, and subject to appropri-
ate constraints, contract law should effectuate the objectives of parties to a
promissory transaction.
Second, the rules that determine the conditions to, and the constraints on,
the legal effectuation of the objectives of parties to promissory transactions,
and the manner in which those objective are ascertained, should consist of the
rules that would be made by a fully informed legislator who seeks to make the
best possible rules of contract law by taking into account all relevant proposi-
tions of morality, policy, and experience (the Legislator). When more than one
such proposition is relevant, the Legislator should exercise good judgment to
give each proposition proper weight, and to either subordinate some proposi-
tions to others, or craft a rule that is the best vector of the propositions, con-
sidering their relative weights, and the extent to which an accommodation can
be fashioned that reflects those relative weights to the fullest practicable
extent.
5 7
Thus, the theory of contract law is the theory of the "best content of
contract law over the long run, not the theory of what contract law
should be at any moment of time when institutional constraints are
taken into account."5 8 While dynamic contract law rejects single
value theories of contracts, it considers values and ideas from differing
schools of thought, even if those values conflict. 59 For example, while
dynamic contract rejects the relational contract 6 0 position that con-
tract is not promise-based,61 it supports the notion that contracts are
relational. The intent and actions of the parties should therefore be
viewed in the context of that relationship. Similarly, while neither
54. As Melvin Eisenberg asserts, "doctrines have a role to play in substantive legal
reasoning, but that is because of the social values that underlie doctrinal stabil-
ity, not because doctrines are either self-evident or established by deduction." Ei-
senberg, supra note 2, at 1753.
55. Id. at 1745.
56. In his article, Eisenberg uses the term "basic contracts principle" to describe the
principles that I will refer to as "dynamic principles" in this Article. I have used
the term "dynamic" instead of "basic contract" to avoid confusing anyone not fa-
miliar with the discussion introduced in Eisenberg's article. See generally id.
57. Id. at 1745.
58. Id. at 1747.
59. Id.
60. See Paul J. Gudel, Essay, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Ex-
change, 46 BUFF. L. REv. 763 (1998); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory:
Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877 (2000).
61. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1747 ("The basic contracts principle rejects the posi-
tion, most closely associated with relational contract theory, but also with the
works of others, such as Atiyah, that contract law is not, or ought not be, promise
based.").
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furthering individual autonomy nor providing economic incentives to
contracting should be the sole or primary objective of contract law, the
values of individual autonomy and wealth maximization should be
taken into account and examined. A dynamic theory of contract does
not strive merely to supplant any existing theory; rather, it considers
the tenets proposed by various theories in order to reach the best rule
for a particular situation. By not slavishly adhering to a "school of
thought," a dynamic theory of contracts has the freedom to address
issues on a substantive level instead of rationalizing results to con-
form to formalistic principles. Strict adherence to one philosophy of
contract law results in myopia. Any given contract theory cannot be
expected to trump every aspect of every other theory every single
time.6 2
Dynamic contract principles make sense because they express the
reality of the human condition. Human desires are not so easily defin-
able or capable of categorization as legal doctrine might suggest. As
Menachem Mautner writes:
Typical of the human condition is the desire for more than one thing at the
same time. It is also typical to both want and not want the same thing at the
same time. In contract, the logic of the law ... is usually binary. The law
usually applies one of two competing, mutually exclusive categories, each one
unqualified and unambiguous.6 3
The application of contract law should be highly contextualized, de-
pending not upon any single word, act, or rule. Individuals are driven
by different desires and motivations that may vary on any given day
or overwhelm at the same time. Events occur that are unpredictable,
even if they meet the legal definition of "foreseeability."64 Contracts
are not created in a vacuum-parties exist in an environment filled
62. Philosophies of contract law often borrow from each other. For example, eco-
nomic theories presume individuals should have the right to make economic deci-
sions for themselves, and that doing so, leads to greater efficiencies benefiting the
larger society. See Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Understanding Commercial
Impracticability: Tempering Efficiency with Community Fairness Norms, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 343, 358 (1995) (discussing one of the "central tenets" of an "eco-
nomic approach" to contracts as "deferring to individual autonomy"). Randy Bar-
nett, an autonomy theorist, relies to a certain extent on economic arguments to
explain why his presumption in favor of specific performance might be reversed
where the seller would experience hardship and the buyer could easily purchase a
replacement good. Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,
4 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 179 (1986).
63. Menachem Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is So Problematic
in the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL IN-
QUIRES L. 545, 574 (2002).
64. For example, few would have predicted the occurrence of the plane hijackings on
September 11, 2001. Yet, the hijacking was deemed to be reasonably foreseeable.
See In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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with social norms, values, and morals. 6 5 To ignore the context in
which a promise was made6 6 is to ignore the reality of human interac-
tions. 6 7 Decision making is further complicated by constraints on cog-
nitive ability that may vary from individual to individual.68 The
Nobel economics laureate Herbert Simon developed the theory of
"bounded rationality" to explain how and why people make decisions
with incomplete information. 69 Unlike neoclassical economics, which
"is based on the assumption that humans are perfectly rational and
will make choices to optimize their gains," bounded rationality recog-
nizes that people "satisfice"; they make the best decisions with the
limited information they have.70 Parties to a contract may make deci-
sions based on inaccurate or incomplete information due to a variety
of factors.
To consider the vacillations of human nature and the limitations of
human awareness and knowledge does not mean, however, that the
law should disregard the need to ensure the security of transactions.
A dynamic application of the law views transactions holistically by
taking into consideration the emotional aspects of making contracts as
well as the more detached business aspects, such as the calculation
and expectation of profit. The analysis of contract should examine
every significant and relevant aspect of the transaction, from the mo-
ment of conception to the filing of the complaint.
A dynamic theory, because it considers evolving societal needs and
values, is best able to address modern contractual issues. Rather than
viewing a contractual dispute as an isolated category, it recognizes
that one dispute may fall into several doctrinal categories. Instead of
65. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1747 ("Part of the human social condition is that
many values are relevant to the creation of a good world, some of which will con-
flict in given cases. Contract law should not attempt to escape these moral and
social conditions.").
66. Considering the relevant conditions of the promise does not mean that the exis-
tence of the promise itself should not be considered. Id. at 1747 ("[Clontract law
normally does not get off the ground unless a party has used an expression that is
or can fairly be interpreted to be a promise . . ").
67. A recent study has shown that parties to a contract themselves "look to context
[not just the words on the page,] for guidance on issues of contract creation."
Deborah A. Schmedemann, Beyond Words: An Empirical Study of Context in
Contract Creation, 55 S.C. L. REV. 145, 146 (2003).
68. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995) ("[H]uman rationality is normally bounded by
limited information and limited information processing.").
69. See generally Duncan K. Foley, Rationality and Ideology in Economics, 71 Soc.
REs. 329 (2004); Andrew W. Lo, The Adaptive Market Hypothesis: Market Effi-
ciency from an Evolutionary Perspective, 30 J. OF PORTFOLIO MGMT. 15, 15-29
(2004).
70. Constance Holden, The Rational Optimist: Will Computers Ever Think Like Peo-
ple? This Expert on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science Asks, Why Not?,
PSYCHOL. TODAY, October 1986, at 54, 56.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
focusing on written or verbal words to create a contract, a dynamic
approach considers what the parties meant when they said or did
what they said or did. A dynamic approach envisions contractual in-
tent as encompassing more than the meaning of words on a page; it
considers why the parties entered into the agreement and whether
their contractual objectives continue to be met in light of changing
circumstances.
A dynamic approach also considers the normative effect of the
transaction itself. Contracts that involve personal relationships
would have different policy implications than those involving purely
commercial ones. 7 1 Thus, the rules governing the enforceability of a
premarital contract would, and should, differ from the analysis of a
commercial sales agreement.
Finally, while contract law should promote the objectives of auton-
omy and efficiency, it should not do so at any cost. A contract is not
comprised of disparate elements but, instead, embodies an entire
transaction (or series of transactions). Consequently, contractual dis-
putes should be approached holistically. An examination of the dis-
pute should not focus solely on a particular word or an isolated act,
but on the entirety of the contract and the conduct of the parties
before, during, and after contract formation. Judges should consider
the social and policy implications of their decisions, yet not be so fear-
ful of customizing justice that the ruling does not fit the circumstances
of each particular case. 72 Judges also should not be fearful of deviat-
ing from established precedent if it appears that society has evolved
such that the application of existing precedent no longer makes sense.
Contract law should take into consideration the relationship of the
parties, as well as the larger societal context affected by, and affecting,
the agreement. A dynamic approach recognizes that the law should
71. The Supreme Court of California recognized that there are
obvious differences between the remedies that realistically may be
awarded with respect to commercial contracts and premarital agree-
ments .... The obvious distinctions between premarital agreements and
ordinary commercial contracts lead us to conclude that factual circum-
stances relating to contract defenses that would not necessarily support
the rescission of a commercial contract may suffice to render a premari-
tal agreement unenforceable.
In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 830 (Cal. 2000).
72. The "just result" principle articulated by Harry Prince reflects, to a certain ex-
tent, a dynamic approach in that it advocates that courts take into account "all
equities of the case, including such factors as the status of the parties, the risk of
out-of-pocket loss or windfall gain, whether either party has engaged in culpable
or meritorious behavior, and any public interests at stake." Harry G. Prince,
Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Parol Evidence, and Use of
the "Just Result" Principle, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 557, 563 (1998). Whereas the
just result principle focuses on the outcome of a decision, a dynamic approach
would, however, prioritize the intent of the parties and the effect of time upon
such intent.
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not only reflect the expectations and conduct of the parties, but influ-
ence them.73
In fact, contract law has already evolved to a certain extent to re-
flect changing social norms. 74 Whereas classical contract law strictly
applied narrow rules and doctrines,75 modern or neoclassical contract
law tends to consider social or equitable factors. 7 6 For example, under
classical contract law, a promise modifying a duty under a contract
not fully performed lacked consideration.77 The modern view, embod-
ied by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, states a different rule:
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either
side is binding
(a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not antici-
pated by the parties when the contract was made; or
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or
(c) to the extent justice requires enforcement in view of material change of
position in reliance on the promise.
78
This rule reflects dynamic principles. Its objective is to set a nor-
mative standard-to state the "best rules" and not necessarily the
rules that most courts have followed.79 It is individualized-focused
on the modification of a specific contract-rather than formalistic and
binary, applicable to all modifications (i.e., if a modification is made
without consideration, then it is not enforceable). It is subjective-
examining whether the circumstances giving rise to the modification
were anticipated by the given parties-rather than objective, asking
whether the circumstances were "reasonably anticipated" or could
have been anticipated by a "reasonable person" and whether there
was a material change of position in reliance (instead of "reasonable
reliance"). It is dynamic because it considers circumstances after con-
73. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129, 1135-39 (1986); Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 659, 675 (1990).
74. K M. Sharma, From "Sanctity" to "Fairness": An Uneasy Transition in the Law
of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 95, 95-97 (1998). Contract law
is not the only area that has evolved to reflect societal changes. For example,
new defense strategies, such as the battered woman syndrome and the cultural
defense, have arisen which reflect society's increased awareness of the issues par-
ticular to battered women and cultural minorities.
75. Feinman, supra note 50, at 1286-87.
76. Sharma, supra note 74, at 100-01 (arguing that "contractual sanctity," resulting
from the reverence for individual autonomy, "has been either gradually replaced
or, at least, supplemented by other competing considerations of justice, paving
way for the emergence of a new contractual morality . . ").
77. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 7.36 (4th ed. 1992).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981).
79. Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 510 (1998).
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tract formation rather than simply at the magical moment of
acceptance.8 0
Modern courts, too, have increasingly adopted a view of contracts
that is in accordance with dynamic principles.81 However, this adop-
tion by the courts has not been consistent or uniform in all jurisdic-
tions.8 2 Even where adoption of a particular dynamic principle is
widespread, the rationale for such adoption varies.8 3 Unfortunately,
when courts have issued rulings that felt instinctively right, they have
had to reason around existing rules that, strictly applied, would have
led to a different result. Thus, while courts continue to recite well-
established doctrinal rules, some have engaged in analysis and ren-
dered results that are inconsistent with a strict application of those
rules in order to achieve a result that is "fair." Contract rules of inter-
pretation or "default rules" have been subject to this type of inconsis-
tent decision-making.8 4 For example, courts often cite the plain
meaning rule, yet very few adhere to it.85 Part III of this Article dis-
80. The U.C.I.T.A., applicable to shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses, also illustrates
dynamic principles, as demonstrated by the following comment:
Contract formation is often a process, rather than a single event. A rule
that a contract must arise at a single point in time and that this single
event defines all the terms of the contract is inconsistent with commer-
cial practice. Contracts are often formed over time; terms are often de-
veloped during performance, rather than before performance occurs.
Often, parties expect to adopt records later and that expectation itself is
the agreement. Rather than modifying an existing agreement, these
terms are part of the agreement itself.
UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 202 cmt. 4, 7 U.L.A. 275 (2002 &
Supp. 2005).
81. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1745. A recent survey of six sections of the Restate-
ment that contradicted longstanding, traditional rules found that, despite the in-
novativeness of these sections, the majority of the courts surveyed accepted them.
See Maggs, supra note 79.
82. Maggs, supra note 79, at 510 ("The American Law Institute's decision to include a
rule in the Restatement (Second) does not mean that a majority of courts have
adopted that rule. The Restatement (Second) strives to state the best rules, not
necessarily the rules that most courts have followed.").
83. Id. at 527 ("First, a few courts appear to have followed the rules on grounds of
precedent. Second, a few other courts appear to have followed the new rules for
policy reasons. Third, several other courts adopted the rules because statutes or
case law require them to follow the Restatement (Second) absent contrary author-
ity. Fourth, the remaining courts appear to have accepted the rules on grounds of
convenience; rather than examine precedent or policy arguments, courts volunta-
rily deferred to the ALI's view of what the law should be.").
84. Ostas & Darr, supra note 62, at 381 ("When a disruptive event has not been ad-
dressed by the parties ex ante, and neither party is at fault, the courts use equita-
ble notions based on community fairness norms to divide the loss between
innocents.").
85. Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementa-
tion, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1729-30 (1997) ("Our sample consists of the first
twenty cases cited by American Jurisprudence 2d as authorities for the rule. All
twenty cases indeed contain one expression or another of the rule. However, it
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cusses the importance of rules of contract interpretation and demon-
strates how they may actually undermine the objectives of contract
law. This Part focuses on the problems specific to form agreements,
although many of the general issues may be applied to customized
agreements.
III. THE NEED FOR A DYNAMIC APPLICATION OF
INTERPRETATION RULES
Dynamic contract law should effectuate the objectives of parties to
a contract "if appropriate conditions are satisfied and subject to appro-
priate constraints."8 6 Modern contract law has moved away from the
objective and standardized character of classical contract law rules to
rules that are individualized and, sometimes, subjective.8 7 In the
area of interpretation, the focus has shifted, to a certain extent, from
the outward conduct of the parties to their internal thoughtsS8 and to
the surrounding circumstances. For example, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts states:
Even though words seem on their face to have only a single possible meaning,
other meanings often appear when the circumstances are disclosed. In cases
of misunderstanding, there must be inquiry into the meaning attached to the
words by each party and into what each knew or had reason to know.
8 9
Similarly, the modern judicial approach to contract rules of inter-
pretation has reflected a more substantive examination of the facts of
a particular case. In the past, courts were reluctant to interfere with
contracts based upon their perceived fairness. More and more, how-
ever, courts are willing to review the fairness of a contract. 90
seems that only one or two of them actually follow it! In five cases, no question of
interpretation was in fact discussed and thus no meaningful comparison may be
drawn between the court's rhetoric and its practice. In two of the remaining
cases, the court held that the contract was in fact ambiguous, and thus extrinsic
evidence was admissible even under the PMR's own terms. Eleven of the remain-
ing thirteen cases stated the PMR, yet explicitly or implicitly (but clearly) consid-
ered the effect of surrounding circumstances, previous or subsequent dealings
between the parties . . .default rules, or the economic social and public policy
background of the transaction."); see also Prince, supra note 72, at 557 (noting
that California courts have consistently applied a contextual analysis while
claiming to apply the plain meaning rule).
86. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1754.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1756-58.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 cmt. b (1981).
90. Chase, supra note 20, at 38; Zamir, supra note 85, at 1749 ("[C]ourts frequently
interpret contracts in a tendentious manner to attain just, fair, and reasonable
results. They interpret contracts against the drafter, in favor of the public inter-
est, and in accordance with predetermined conceptions of the desirability or un-
desirability of certain types of clauses. At times, they do so explicitly; at times,
tacitly.").
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Yet, this shift away from objective factors and standards to a more
substantive review has not been uniform91 or even acknowledged. In
fact, many of the interpretation rules ostensibly only to be used to reg-
ulate the process of contracting are actually used to regulate the con-
tent of contracts. 9 2  The U.C.C., for example, contains many
provisions that require the parties to act in good faith and in a reason-
able manner in the creation of a contract but that do not pertain to the
substantive terms of that contract. 9 3 A review of relevant case law
indicates that such a judicial analysis has not been limited to the pro-
cess of contracting but was influenced by the results of that process.9 4
A. Overview of Contract Rules of Interpretation
Contract disputes arise in a variety of different situations. One of
the most common types of disputes involves the interpretation of a
word or writing. 9 5 The resolution of the dispute requires determining
both the intent of the parties and the meaning of the terms of their
agreement. 96 Contract interpretation is essential to determining
whether a contract was formed and, if so, the nature of each party's
obligations. 9 7
Not surprisingly, contract rules of interpretation are varied and
numerous. 98 While they may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 9 9
91. Maggs, supra note 79, at 508-10 (stating that the Restatement rules are not
those necessarily followed by the courts). In fact, Farnsworth notes that, at least
with respect to the role of reliance, there has been a trend favoring formality.
Farnsworth, supra note 51, at 218-22.
92. Zamir, supra note 85, at 1745 ("[A]n examination of judicial practice reveals a
tendency to use information regulation as a means for regulating content. Ac-
cording to the definition of 'conspicuous' in section 1-201(10) of the UCC, the use
of capital letters or 'larger or other contrasting type or color' should suffice to
meet this requirement. However, several courts have refused to enforce such dis-
claimers when they have been printed on the reverse side of a form, reference to
them on the front page was not conspicuous enough, or the consumers' attention
was not specifically drawn to them.").
93. Id. at 1746; see also U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (2004) ("A price to be fixed by the seller or
by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith.").
94. Zamir, supra note 85, at 1746.
95. Prince, supra note 72, at 567-68.
96. Mark K. Glasser & Keith A. Rowley, On Parole: The Construction and Interpreta-
tion of Written Agreements and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence in Contract Litiga-
tion, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 661 (1997) ("When litigation results [from
contractual disputes], the threshold issue for the parties, their counsel, and the
court are often the same: What are the complete terms of the parties' agreement,
and what was the parties' intent in entering into it?").
97. Prince, supra note 72, at 567-68.
98. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35, at 547 ("Contract law has more rules regulating
various aspects of the contracting relationship than are needed solely to perform
its enforcement and interpretation functions."). The authors further note that
statutory drafters and courts often adopt inefficient default rules and standards.
Id.
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they can generally be classified into four basic categories: definitional
rules, gap fillers, evidentiary rules, and judicial guidance rules.10 0
"Definitional rules" of interpretation seek to determine what the par-
ties meant by the words they used in the contract. Modern courts tend
to use definitional rules that consider both the objective meaning of
words as well as the parties' subjective understanding of those words.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets forth definitional rules of
interpretation as follows:
(1) Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circum-
stances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given
great weight.
(2) A writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the
same transaction are interpreted together.
(3) Unless a different intention is manifested,
(a) where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in
accordance with that meaning;
(b) technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning when
used in a transaction within their technical field.101
"Gap fillers" refer to court-supplied terms regarding issues the par-
ties have failed to address.102 The Restatement states: "When the par-
ties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed
with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their
rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is
99. See Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the "Four
Corners" to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 Miss. L.J. 73 (1999).
Rowley explains:
Over time, courts and scholars have recognized certain "rules" or "max-
ims" of construction and interpretation to guide courts and litigants in
their efforts to give effect to the parties' mutual intention at the time of
contracting. These rules appear in no code, and there is less than uni-
versal agreement among courts and commentators as to whether all of
the maxims . . . are legitimate guides to construction and as to what
priorities, if any, courts are to observe among the various rules.
Id. at 82.
100. The Author gratefully acknowledges Melvin Eisenberg's suggestion of the inclu-
sion of a taxonomy. I have categorized the interpretation rules in this Part ac-
cording to their function in a given case. Some interpretation rules may fit into
two categories depending on how they are applied. The plain meaning rule, for
example, states that where a writing appears to be complete and is not facially
ambiguous, the court must interpret the words in accordance with their ordinary
meaning and may not resort to extrinsic evidence. See CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 9, § 3.10. The purpose of the plain meaning rule is thus to help deter-
mine the meaning of a particular word or phrase as well as to limit the admissi-
bility of extrinsic evidence. Thus, the plain meaning rule may be categorized as
both a definitional rule as well as an evidentiary rule. Trade usage, as another
example, may be used to interpret terms and to imply terms-thus it is both a
definitional rule and a gap filler, depending on the way it is used by the court.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981).
102. See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in
an Imperfect World: What to Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or
Have Drafted Incomplete Bargains, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 323 (2004).
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supplied by the court."10 3 These gap fillers tend to embody industry
norms or customs. 1.0 4
"Evidentiary rules" of interpretation, such as the parol evidence
rule' 0 5 and the four corners doctrine,106 govern the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence. While evidentiary rules govern what courts can
consider, "judicial guidance rules" instruct how a judge or jury should
evaluate a disputed term or provision. Many judicial guidance rules
involve the weighing of contractual terms, such as the presumption
favoring the nondrafting partylO7 or the presumption favoring specific
terms over general terms.' 0 8 Often, judicial guidance rules, such as
the strict construction of guaranty agreements and exemption clauses,
are derived from policy or legislative decisions.1O9
Typically, the courts will rely to varying degrees upon these rules
of interpretationl 0 to guide their examination of such disputes."'l
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981).
104. Holder v. Swift, 147 S.W. 690, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ("[W]hen both parties to
a contract are engaged in the particular trade they will be presumed to have
knowledge of such custom. It is not necessary in such a case to prove actual
knowledge .... (quoting J.E. Smith & Co. v. Russell Lumber Co., 72 A. 577, 579
(Conn. 1909))).
105. Shocklee v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2004); Singer v. West
Publ'g Corp., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Norwest Bank Minn. v. Mid-
western Mach. Co., 481 N.W.2d 875, 881 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
106. Under the four corners doctrine, if a contract is unambiguous on its face, a court
may not look to extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning. See, e.g., In re Minn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 346 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2003); Kerin v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 116 F.3d 988 (2d Cir. 1997).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981); 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (rev. ed. 1998 & Supp. 2005).
108. See generally Glasser & Rowley, supra note 96 (discussing interpretation rules
under Texas law).
109. Other examples include strict construction of exemption clauses and disclaimers.
See id. at 689; see also Guillory v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375, 378 (La. Ct.
App. 1975) (regarding waiver of warranties); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 77-78 (N.J. 1960) (same).
110. See, e.g., So. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Pac. Pipelines, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d
777, 782-83 (1999) ("Faced with contract language that is reasonably susceptible
to more than one meaning, certain general rules of contract interpretation come
into play to aid the court in resolving ambiguity."). For a general analysis of
default rules, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 94 (1989); Randy E.
Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L.
REV. 821 (1992).
111. Some interpretation rules, such as the plain meaning rule, have diminished in
importance. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1768 ( "RUinder modern contract law
... the plain meaning rule has been largely abandoned."). Further,
[alny determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the
light of the relevant evidence of the situation and relations of the parties,
the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary negotiations and
statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing be-
tween the parties.
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These interpretation rules 112 provide the backdrop against which the
contract will be examined1 3 and have been the subject of much aca-
demic discussion.11 4 A party's contractual obligations are not limited
to what is specifically stated in the written agreement. 1 15 In some
cases, the courts may supply terms or "gap fillers" where the parties
have entered into a contract but failed, either intentionally or not, to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(1) cmt. b (1981). Many courts, how-
ever, continue to use the plain meaning rule to decide issues of contract interpre-
tation. See, e.g., Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360,
1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous,
they must be given their plain meaning-extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to
interpret them .... In this case, because the ... provisions of the contract are
clear and unambiguous, we must construe them according to their plain mean-
ing, without resort to parol evidence."); see also Shocklee v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 369 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Under Louisiana law, '[wihen the words of
a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd results, no further inter-
pretation may be made in search of the parties' intent.' As a result, if a contract
is unambiguous on its face, the 'contract's meaning and the intent of its parties
must be sought within the four corners of the document and cannot be explained
or contradicted by extrinsic evidence.'" (quoting LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2046
(1987); Am. Totalisator Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 3 F.3d at 810, 813 (5th Cir.
1993))); Starpower Commc'ns, LLC v. Federal Commc'n Comm'n, 334 F.3d 1150,
1153 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[T]he Commission was obliged to apply the contract law of
Virginia, including the rule that 'where the terms of the contract are clear and
unambiguous, we will construe those terms according to their plain meaning.'").
112. Glasser & Rowley, supra note 96, at 661-62 (noting a distinction between "con-
struction" and "interpretation" of a contract, and remarking that while the terms
are often used interchangeably, "interpretation of a contract is the process of de-
termining the meaning of the words and symbols used in the contract, while con-
struction of a contract is the process of determining the legal effect of those words
and symbols in light of many factors external to the contract itself' (citing 3 AR-
THUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 534, at 7-9 (1960))). In this Article,
because I intend to address both "construction" and "interpretation," I shall use
the word "interpretation" to include both meanings.
113. Zamir, supra note 85, at 1710. Zamir explains:
Contract interpretation and supplementation is conventionally con-
ceived of as a multistage process, in which various sources, including
express terms, course of performance, course of dealing, trade usages,
default rules, and general standards of reasonableness, are sequentially
resorted to .... A competing theory, inspired by Karl Llewellyn, main-
tains that the decisionmaker should be free to consider all the elements
of the [contract] ....
Id.; see also Glasser & Rowley, supra note 96 (examining rules of construction
used by Texas courts).
114. The parol evidence rule in particular has been the subject to much discussion.
See Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The
Sounds of Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 35 (1985); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evi-
dence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpreta-
tion, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998); Lawrence M. Solan, Written Contract as Safe
Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87 (2001).
115. See, e.g., Hadjiyannakis, supra note 114 (exploring the relationship between im-
plied terms and the parol evidence rule).
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address certain issues.116 In other cases, the law may presume cer-
tain standards or obligations unless they are specifically dis-
claimed. 117 For example, the U.C.C. provides an implied warranty of
merchantability for goods that holds the seller liable for breach unless
such warranty is expressly disclaimed.11s Consequently, a party to a
contract should be aware of the effect of these interpretation rules
during the negotiation process.119
1. How Strict Application of Interpretation Rules Undermines
Contract Law Objectives
The goal of the courts in contract interpretation is to find the solu-
tion that the parties would have enacted if they had addressed the
problem during negotiations.120 The justification for the court's lim-
ited role in contract interpretation is based upon both autonomy and
economic efficiency objectives.121 The autonomy view holds that the
exercise of state coercion against individuals to a contract must be jus-
tified.122 Such coercion is justified if the court simply ascertains what
the individuals have themselves agreed to do. 123 The efficiency view
holds that the parties entered into a contract in order to maximize the
surplus that their deal can create. 124 If the court enforces a solution
other than what the parties adopted, the maximization objective is de-
feated.125 In practice, however, the interpretations adopted by the
courts have tended to reflect their political philosophies or normative
goals. 126 The stated intention of providing interpretations that reflect
the intent of the parties has not resulted in judicial decisions free of
116. Id. at 35-36.
117. Id.
118. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-316 (2003).
119. See Glasser & Rowley, supra note 96, at 661 ("[N]o lawyer should draft a contract
or adopt a contract litigation strategy without accounting for the effect of these
rules and principles." ).
120. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35, at 568-69.
121. Id. at 569.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Peter W. Schroth, Language and Law, 46 AM. J. CoMp. L. SUPPLEMENT 17, 28
(1998) ("[Jludges ... sometimes assert linguistic compulsion for results actually
reached by legal reasoning, and more frequently add linguistic reasons-but only
when they happen to point toward the same conclusion-to their opinions along-
side the legal reasons that really underlie the results. Whatever certain Supreme
Court Justices may pretend in their opinions, the average well trained lawyer or
judge understands the task of applying a statute to a particular case better before
the linguistic research and analysis are undertaken than the non-lawyer linguist
does when it is completed.").
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normative judgments.127 They have, however, sometimes served the
strategic purpose of defusing political criticism.128
In addition to the practical difficulty-and questionable desirabil-
ity-of rendering interpretations free of the values of the judiciary,12 9
there are disadvantages to strict application of interpretation rules. If
the interpretation of a contract depends upon rules that are not intui-
tive to a non-lawyer, and the default rule (i.e., gap filler) is not what a
party intended or desired, then the will of the contracting parties is
not furthered and the experience of self-actualization through bar-
gaining is thwarted.130 Furthermore, if application of the rules re-
sults in unexpected contractual interpretations, individuals may
hesitate to enter into agreements or refrain from entering into them
altogether. At the very least, the application of non-intuitive interpre-
tation rules would prompt a party to seek the guidance and assistance
of legal counsel, which may decrease the number of transactions (or at
least slow the completion of those transactions), increase the cost of
transactions, 13 1 and deter those with few resources from engaging in
127. Prince, supra note 72, at 564 (noting that judges use the standard or rule of inter-
pretation "that they think will give rise to a just result in the particular case ....
[UInder a guise of interpretation, a court will actually enforce its notions of 'pub-
lic policy,' which is 'nothing more than an attempt to do justice" (quoting
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 9, § 3-16)).
128. For example, Professor Jim Chen contends that the "new textualism of the Rehn-
quist Court" has:
cloaked itself in a shroud of quasi-scientific linguistic analysis, seeking
semantic shelter among lexicographic islands in a sea of uncertainty.
Armed with ad hoc linguistic reasoning and its choice of dictionaries, the
next textualism suggests that exclusive reliance on the 'ordinary mean-
ing of ... language in its textual context' and the 'established canons of
construction' will shield judges from the pernicious influences of prag-
matism and contextually contingent interpretation.
Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263,
1267 (1995) (citations omitted). While Chen was referring to statutory interpre-
tation, the criticism is equally applicable to contractual interpretations.
129. Schroth, supra note 126, at 27-28. Schroth explains:
The task of judges is judging .... This task is entrusted to judges be-
cause of their legal training and experience. It is difficult to say whether
it is worse that some judges-even Supreme Court Justices!-feel the
need to "legitimize" by pretending they mechanically follow linguistic
science or some other science rather than doing their jobs or that there is
such hostility to judges that they may be correct.
Id.
130. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1769 ("A rule that would limit the determination of
the meaning of a written instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems
to the court to be clear and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the
intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability
our language has not attained." (quoting Pac. Gas. & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968))).
131. The existence of interpretation rules increase the costs of transactions for those
unfamiliar with the rules as well as those who wish to contract out or around
them. See Zamir, supra note 85, at 1755-56. Zamir explains:
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legally binding contracts. In anticipation of how courts may apply in-
terpretation rules, the parties might engage in inefficient contracting
behavior. 13 2 For example, they may spend time crafting complex pro-
visions to address unlikely scenarios out of fear that their failure to do
so would result in a court's application of a standard to which neither
party would have agreed.
Consequently, a strict application of interpretation rules slows
down the rate of economic transactions and keeps out new players;
both these effects in turn increase market stagnation and undermine
the "economic efficiency" objective of contract law.133 The complexity
of the rules puts a contractually inexperienced party-or a party with-
out a lawyer-at a disadvantage to a more sophisticated one. Because
of their sheer number and complexity, prior knowledge of interpreta-
tion rules aids a party in contract drafting. A party already familiar
with the interpretation rules can contract out or around certain de-
fault provisions; on the other hand, a party unfamiliar with these
rules may not realize that by agreeing to a particular provision, he or
she is giving up an advantage typically implied by the courts. In addi-
tion, by deterring those with little money to spend on legal counsel
from entering into business transactions, the application of interpre-
tation rules weakens the ancillary objective of contract law-that of
promoting fairness. Because the rules work to maintain the status
quo in favor of those with more resources or greater bargaining power,
they perpetuate a social and economic injustice against those who may
have business ambition but little money. Given the high cost of legal
fees and the seeming complexity and mystery of contract law, an indi-
vidual might be inclined to make decisions that would minimize
chances of business success or forgo a business venture for a more se-
cure and certain field which has fewer risks but limited financial
rewards.
A central function of default rules ... is to reduce transaction costs. A
default rule that reflects what most contracting parties would have
wished to incorporate into their contract saves them the costs of negoti-
ating and formulating it themselves. At the same time, the nonmanda-
tory nature of the rule indicates that there may be some transactions in
which it is worthwhile for the parties to contract around it. However, in
many cases, the very existence of a default rule, like the existence of an
established usage, imposes additional costs on parties wishing to lay
down a contrary or different term in their contract.
Id.
132. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35, at 604 (writing of gap-filling standards that
"[the state wastes resources in drafting them; the parties waste resources in con-
tracting out; and when courts are expected to use standards actively to police
bargains, parties may create sets of rules they would otherwise have preferred to
omit").
133. Id. at 608 ("[I]nefficient defaults only raise transaction costs unnecessarily.").
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2. The Interplay of Interpretation Rules with Evolving Business
and Social Norms and Needs
Evolving societal and business norms and needs affect, and are af-
fected by, contract law and the established rules of interpretation.
This section focuses on two significant changes-the increase in con-
tracts between parties of different cultural and linguistic back-
grounds,' 3 4 and the rise in the use of form agreements. 13 5
a. Cultural Assumptions Underlying Interpretation Rules
If courts resort to interpretation rules without giving proper con-
sideration to language and cultural issues in reviewing a contractual
dispute, the American-born, native English speaker has an inherent
advantage because United States contract law assumes that both par-
ties are American-born, native English speakers.13 6 However, the in-
creasing globalization of commerce makes this assumption
inaccurate. 13 7 The Internet and improvements in transportation have
enabled participation in international commerce for economic players
who would have, in the past, been prevented from doing so for a lack of
resources. Even a decade ago, global commercial transactions were
limited to multinational corporations dealing in large dollar sales; to-
day, anyone with a credit card and Internet access can participate in
commerce worldwide. As technology enables even small dollar trans-
actions to occur across international boundaries, 138 the potential for
134. See generally Steven Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Lan-
guage Fraud and English Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027,
1029-30 (1996); Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business:
Recommendations for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Pro-
grams for B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 441 (2002); Gloria
M. Sanchez, A Paradigm Shift in Legal Education: Preparing Law Students for
the Twenty-First Century: Teaching Foreign Law, Culture and Legal Language of
the Major U.S. American Trading Partners, 34 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 635 (1997).
135. See generally Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, supra note 19, at 627
("From video rentals to the sale of automobiles, form contracts are everywhere.").
136. Steven Bender has written that:
American law has little patience for immigrants who arrive unable to
understand English .... As consumers, immigrants unable to under-
stand English are left largely to the morals of the marketplace. Existing
consumer protection regulation too often assumes that consumers are
proficient in English .... Sadly, this gap in protection has made some
Latinos/as and other language minorities the victims of choice for un-
scrupulous merchants who prey on their inability to understand the
terms of the bargain.
Bender, supra note 134, at 1029-30.
137. See Sanchez, supra note 134, at 636 ('[Tihe U.S. American practitioner, now more
than ever before, operates in a world society and economy constituted not only of
an international society and economy but also of interdependent nations' societies
and economies.").
138. Ponte, supra note 134, at 469 ("The Internet's low economic barriers to entry in-
vite participation in commerce ... by small entities and individuals who cannot
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conflict due to language or cultural misunderstandings grows. 1 3 9
Therefore, an understanding of the parties' cultural norms and biases
is essential in order to understand their contractual intent.140
For example, because of the influence of Confucianism141 and Tao-
ism,142 the cultures of East Asian nations have been characterized as
afford direct participation in many traditional markets .... These low barriers
and greater participation . . . also mean a greater incidence of small transac-
tions." (quoting Henry R. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand
for New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 675, 699 (2000))).
139. One commentator notes that while contract law may be compared in countries
sharing a Western legal tradition because their market economies are relatively
homogeneous, comparisons between Western and non-Western systems (e.g.,
German law versus Chinese law) must take into account the underlying political,
economic, and cultural conditions. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy
and Change in the World's Legal System, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 21-22 (1997).
Another commentator has noted that:
Foremost among the differences that affect international business nego-
tiations are the two contrary approaches to making decisions. Western
business standards are specifically task-oriented and thus rely greatly
on the individual's apprehension of facts and figures .... Asian business
cultures on the other hand emphasise [sic] the importance of maintain-
ing long-term relationships. Facts and figures, they think, might change
tomorrow, but it is the strength of the relationship that enables business
partners to weather such changes.
U-En Ng, You Talkin' to Me, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia), Apr. 9, 2003, at 6.
140. See Bryan A. Liang & Anita C. Liang, Lies on the Lips: Dying Declaration, West-
ern Legal Bias, and Unreliability, 5 LAW TEXT CULTURE 113, 125-26 (2001). The
authors explain:
The general linguistic conventions... must also be understood and have
been experienced by the listener. This brings cultural norms and biases
to the very forefront of understanding of meaning. In conjunction, an
understanding and knowledge of the context of the original speech is es-
sential; beyond the physical circumstances of the authorial context, the
social and thus cultural bias between the parties must be understood
and known, including the events and circumstances that led up to the
author's speech... Thus, subjective meaning requires at a minimum,
assuming similar backgrounds, commentaries, and retorts, a knowledge
of the speaker's linguistic conventions, specific physical and social con-
texts, and all other important factors ....
Id. at 126.
141. Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Cul-
ture Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 13 (2000), available at http://www.
hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/13-peng.pdf.
142. Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains are High and the Emperor is
Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 459, 482 (2003). The
authors explain:
Governmental intervention through rules and laws is not only consid-
ered to be unnecessary, but also detrimental to the society .... Taoism
focuses on the disdain for the legal rules that Westerners take for
granted. In an extenuated way, Taoism would seemingly put contrac-
tual relationship, and subsequent obligations, into some kind of meta-
physical or transcendental realm which must be realized, not through
some kind of Western-style negotiation, but on self-realization. This
model is totally foreign to Western concepts of law.
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less litigious than the United States.143 Confucianism emphasizes
dispute resolution through collective social responsibility and mutual
concession.144 Accordingly, the literal meaning of the words on the
page might be less important than the spirit or purpose of the transac-
tion. 145 In China, the signing of a contract often indicates only the
existence of a relationship and, consequently, the commencement of
negotiations.14 6 A contract might thus be signed that intentionally
contains incomplete terms or terms that differ from what a party
might ultimately desire.147 Rather than expending time and good will
negotiating every conceivable negative scenario, more faith is placed
upon the nonjudicial resolution of issues when, and if, they occur. 148
Id.
143. The notion of contract as a means of implementing individual autonomy is a dis-
tinctly Western notion. See Alexander J. Bolla, Jr., The (Im)probable Future in
Japanese Charter Parties: The Language of Law, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 107
(1998) ("Western contract and charter party models predominantly base obliga-
tion on the notion of a consensual promise-that declaration of intent to act or
forbear in a specific way, thereby justifying the promisee's understanding that
the promisor is bound."). By contrast, the Japanese concept of community cou-
pled with "insiderness" "blurs a responsive and tolerant Western understanding
of negotiation and contracting with those from the Japanese culture." Id.
144. Peng, supra note 142, at 13:9-13:13; see also Pattison & Herron, supra note 142,
at 478-80 ("Confucian concepts are critical to remember in ... discussion of con-
tract law. They impact not only the Western understanding of sanctity of con-
tract, but also the whole concept of rule of law.").
145. Peng, supra note 141, at 13:21 ("For Asians, vague language is often necessary to
ensure consensus on sensitive issues. Ambiguity is almost an art form; it is
viewed as a useful device in mitigating conflict and building common positions
and confidence .... Asians tend to avoid legalism and emphasize group "har-
mony" and "consensus." To most Asians, disputes and negotiations disturb group
harmony.").
146. Pattison & Herron, supra note 142, at 460.
147. The 1999 enactment of the Uniform Contract Law by the Chinese government
"attempted to bring Chinese business practices into ... conformity or consistency
with ... Western practices." Id. However, the adoption of this legislation does
not eliminate deeply rooted cultural differences. Id. at 461. As Pattison and Her-
ron note, "[aifter all the necessary legislation is enacted, one problem will still
remain. How will all the new laws be enforced? One commentator has noted
that, 'non-observance of these laws is quite universal.'" Id. (quoting Eric W. Orts,
The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 61 (2001)).
148. A neighbor, an immigrant from China, recently asked me to review a research
and development partnership agreement that he had signed with a business
partner in China. This neighbor is a scientist and an executive at a large United
States biotechnology company and his business partner is the CEO of a multimil-
lion dollar pharmaceutical company in China. The agreement was very brief and
contained broad, general terms intended to capture the spirit of a partnership
without outlining any of the specifics of performance (or remedies, in event of
breach). It was signed by both parties without review by counsel prior to signa-
ture. Of course, as an American lawyer specializing in contracts, I had many
questions regarding the terms of the agreement. My neighbor admitted that
neither he nor his partner had considered all the contingencies but had faith that
they would be able to resolve any conflict. After some discussion, I concluded that
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Frequently, the Chinese will forego a formal contract altogether, view-
ing it as "unnecessary, [and] sometimes offensive, when rules of loy-
alty and mutual obligation structure the business environment."149
In the United States on the other hand, the signing of a contract indi-
cates the end of contractual negotiations.150
The language spoken by the contracting parties affects their un-
derstanding of the written agreement even if that agreement has been
translated.151 Many commentators have written about the difficulty
in providing accurate and meaningful translations. 152 For example,
"Japanese does not have a future tense grammatical component, [so]
their optimism and the simplicity of their agreement reflected not their naivete
but their cultural beliefs regarding the nature of contracts and business partner-
ships. As my neighbor put it, if something went wrong they wouldn't sue each
other anyway-they would just go their separate ways.
149. Pattison & Herron, supra note 142, at 487-88.
150. Id. at 460. The authors note that this competing view of contract formation often
results in misunderstanding:
Westerns view contract formation as the culmination of a negotiating
process and period .... From the Chinese perspective, the "final" con-
tract signifies that a relationship exists and terms-negotiations may
now continue. The "final" contract signals the beginning for real con-
tract negotiations. Is it surprising, then, that Westerners view Chinese,
in this context, as unethical in failing to fulfill their supposedly agreed-
upon contractual obligations.
Id. The Japanese are also often criticized by their Western contractual partners
for failing to abide by the precise terms of a contract. Bolla, supra note 143, at
112. Yet, as Bolla notes, strict adherence to contractual terms is often viewed by
the Japanese as "undue rigidity." Id.
151. See Sanchez, supra note 134, at 658-59 ("Language symbols, grammatical struc-
tures, meanings, sounds, intonation, and accent are culturally defined. Culture
and enculturation form ideas, methods of analyses, perceptions, behaviors and
beliefs. The language selected to structure and convey these cultural phenomena
reflects cultural content. Language is a product of culture and, simultaneously,
is formative of culture .... Language is understood because of culture."); see also
Sanford Schane, Ambiguity and Misunderstanding in the Law, 25 T. JEFFERSON
L. REV. 167, 189 (2002) ("There are features inherent to language that can con-
tribute to misunderstanding, such as the multiple meanings or references of
words and expressions. Speakers may not know all the nuances, and even if they
do, they may believe that some of these are not at all applicable to their legal
situations and so they do not feel compelled to specify which meaning or reference
is intended."); Schroth, supra note 126, at 39 ("[L]anguage is not a set of labels for
objects and concepts that exist independent of any particular language; rather
everything we know and are is shaped by, and shapes, our language.").
152. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Catego-
ries in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. COMP. L. 43, 50 (1998)
("[Clommunication is doomed to imperfection. Perfect communication by means
of human language would require that all interlocutors have identical cultural
backgrounds and physical makeups. Difficulties in transmitting concepts across
cultural-linguistic differences are related to the level of abstraction connoted by
the words in question."). Curran also notes that "[w]hen translating, one discov-
ers that one transmits only a portion of the original." Id. at 56.
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the future is indeterminate and probable .... "153 Because Western
cultures, in contrast, view a promise as a "present intent to be bound
to a future performance," Japanese must "traverse[] from doubt to
certainty in the probable mood."154 Legal concepts are often difficult
to convey when the speakers have different linguistic backgrounds
and even a single word may have multiple linguistic associations. 155
Noam Chomsky has stated that "although there is much reason to be-
lieve that languages are to a significant extent cast in the same mold,
there is little reason to suppose that reasonable procedures of transla-
tion are in general possible."156 Even among native English speakers,
there may be differences. Regional dialects and pronunciations may
affect a party's understanding of the terms of a contract. 15 7 Even the
same language may have a "plurality of discourses"1 5 8 as is evidenced
by the different forms of English spoken by an Australian, a Bostoner,
a New Yorker, and a Londoner.
153. See Bolla, supra note 143, at 110.
154. Id. Alexander Bolla states that the goal is "to convey the futurity portion of a
charter party promise from West to East while coupling the promise with obliga-
tion." Id. at 111.
155. For example, Gloria Sanchez illustrates the "difficulty of communicating the
same legal concept" by explaining how a single word-investment-is understood
by a Spanish and an English speaker:
In Spanish, the term investment translates to "inversi6n." The terms
"investment and "inversi6n" have different Latin roots. In English, "in-
vestment," from investire, means "to install, to surround, to clothe in a
garment;" whereas "inversi6n" in Spanish, from invertire, means "to
change position, to turn over or turn around." This variance in meaning
suggests that the terms differ diametrically: in the United States "in-
vestment" seeks long-term benefits, while in Mexico, "inversion" seeks
short-term profit.
Sanchez, supra note 134, at 662.
156. NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 202 n.17 (1965). Some of the
difficulties of effective translation may be attributed to the "unconscious" and
metaphorical nature of the "conceptual systems" governing human behavior. See
Liang & Liang, supra note 140, at 119. The authors further note that
"[m]etaphors . .. highlight some aspects of our experiences; yet they necessarily
hide other aspects of those experiences, making it difficult to conceptualize our
experiences in other terms." Id. at 120.
157. Curran notes that distortion prevents identical understanding of the same con-
cept, even between individuals of the same nation:
Each person's cultural context is unique to some extent, such that no two
people's understanding of a concept will be identical in any discourse
outside of purely symbolic ones, such as that of mathematics. It has also
been proposed that a word never has the same meaning twice, neither
when used more than once by the same person, nor when used by differ-
ent people.
Curran, supra note 152, at 49. That notwithstanding, the likelihood of effective
communication increases "the more interlocutors share in terms of their cultural
contexts." Id. at 50-51.
158. Id. at 54-55.
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Even within a particular region, cultural and linguistic differences
may affect the parties' contractual intentions. In Latin American
countries, despite the regional proximity and existence of a common
language (for all countries except Brazil), these differences affect the
way business is conducted.159 Argentina has shown more initiative in
the area of Internet commerce, while Colombia has suffered from po-
litical turmoil. 16o Although Brazil has "more money and a larger pop-
ulation than Argentina," its e-commerce efforts have been hindered by
its geography and language.161 Even with respect to those nations
with Spanish as a common language, there are different dialects, idi-
oms, and slang that may change the meaning of words from region to
region. 162
A consideration of cultural and linguistic differences, however,
does not mean deferring to the law of the non-American party's coun-
try. A dynamic approach to contract interpretation should not be mis-
taken for a relativistic approach. The fact that many Latin American
legal systems do not recognize a digital signature 163 does not mean
that an electronic contract subject to United States law should not be
binding.164 Nor should the decisionmaker fall into the trap of broad
generalizations and stereotyping in an effort to recognize differences
between the parties.16 5 Still, the cultural and linguistic differences
159. Luz E. Nagle, E-commerce in Latin America: Legal and Business Challenges for
Developing Enterprise, 50 Am. U. L. REV. 859, 862 (2001).
160. Id. at 862-63.
161. Id. at 862.
162. Id. at 866-67 ("Despite what many people wrongly assume, Latin America is not
a single entity. It consists of independent countries with complex and diverse
geography . . . These countries contain non-homogenous markets that, despite
sharing a common language (with the exception of Brazil), differ economically,
politically, culturally, technologically and demographically. As for language, it is
somewhat simplistic to assume that the Spanish spoken throughout Latin
America is the same, or that one dialect and one form of slang exists throughout
the region. One idiom of Spanish does not bridge seventeen different countries,
as words change meaning from region to region and can pose problems for an e-
commerce business marketing itself through Latin America.").
163. Id. at 917.
164. Latin American countries tend to require more contract formalities than are nec-
essary in the United States. See id. at 916 ("For the creation of a right, the law
requires certain contracts to be finalized in written form, while other contracts
require writing, notarized documents and registration, and authentication by
handwritten signature. Thus, any e-transaction taking place in countries that
have yet to enact e-commerce legislation may prove unenforceable."). Nagle fur-
ther notes that "[iut is still uncertain how Latin American judges will handle elec-
tronic judges. Few judges are technologically savvy. Many do not have
computers, and for several judges Internet access 'could still be considered a priv-
ilege,' especially outside the main cities." Id. at 918 (citation omitted).
165. In the criminal law context, courts have sometimes used stereotypes to inaccu-
rately portray the cultural background of the defendant. See Nancy S. Kim, The
Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A Framework for Anal-
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between the parties may have a significant effect on their understand-
ing of the contract or of the bargaining process. A failure to acknowl-
edge these differences assumes a norm (i.e., that the bargaining
parties are both native English speakers who share the same cultural
and linguistic frames of reference) that may not be in accordance with
reality. By taking into consideration who the parties are, a dynamic
approach fulfills one of the primary objectives of contract interpreta-
tion, which is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the parties.
An understanding of the cultural and linguistic background of the con-
tracting parties can only enhance the ability to determine those
intentions.166
Cultural and linguistic differences abound in international trans-
actions as well as in transactions between and among residents of the
United States. "[Miany U.S. residents are [non] native .. .speak-
ers"167 and many non-native speakers are business owners. 168 Cen-
sus reports demonstrate a rapid rise in Latino/a and Asian owned
businesses, 16 9 increasing the odds that a party to a contract may be
negotiating in a language that is not her primary one. Beyond purely
linguistic differences, a party's background and experience may affect
the contractual context, even among those sharing the same geograph-
ical boundaries.170 Anthony Chase, for example, has noted that be-
cause classical contract law rested on the illusion that contracts were
entered into voluntarily by free individuals, its application historically
failed to alleviate the oppression of African-Americans, who may have
been deceived or coerced into transactions.17 1 Blake Morant has ar-
ysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 117-21 (1997) (describing two cases in which evidence
of cultural backgrounds was "misused").
166. In other words, to truly "get inside the heads" of the bargaining parties, "it is
essential to have a thorough understanding of what underlies their thinking."
Pattison & Herron, supra note 142, at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Lim, supra note 40, at 579.
168. Id. at 586 (speaking about the 1997 U.S. Census Bureau report which indicated
that Latina/os and Asians owned approximately 2.1 million, or 10.2%, of all non-
farm businesses in the United States).
169. Id. at 586-87; see also Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of
Contractual Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 233 (2003) ("During the later part of the twentieth century,
women-owned and minority-owned business proprietorships increased exponen-
tially ... Itihe number of minority-owned businesses rose in the later half of the
twentieth century from 8.8% to 12.5%.").
170. The same issues raised by cultural and linguistic differences occur between and
among citizens of the same nation as between and among citizens of different
nations, although the degree of those differences will vary. Curran, supra note
152, at 91.
171. See Chase, supra note 20, at 65 ("If we are to achieve a more comprehensive view
of the intersection of the law and the lives of African-American people, then we
must begin to interrogate the significance of the ideological diversity within our
culture.").
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
gued that the objectivity of contract law is "illusory" with respect to
many real-world transactions. 17 2 A dynamic application of contract
law recognizes that the experiences, resources, native language, socio-
economic, and cultural background of each party affect that party's
bargaining position and/or understanding of the agreement. 173 With-
out taking these factors into account, the default is the status quo,
meaning that with respect to interpretation rules, the party most fa-
miliar with the English language and American business practices
will have an advantage. Without an express acknowledgment of the
roles that language and culture play in a transaction, the law assumes
that there are no differences and that all bargaining parties are native
English speakers, who are born and raised in the geographical region
of the governing law and who speak the same dialect indigenous to
that region. 174
Failure to consider differences that exist between parties who
share the same geographical boundaries may also undermine another
objective of contract law-that of achieving distributional justice.175
Not only are members of a language or cultural minority affected as
individuals, but the inability of contract law to consider these differ-
172. Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract
Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1998). Morant
explains:
[Tihe objectivity and abstraction fostered by the principles of contractual
theory have an illusory quality when viewed in terms of actual human
contexts. Because bargainers are affected and influenced by environ-
mental and societal stimuli, their resultant conduct may not conform to
the egalitarian goals of contractual rules. Indeed, the very act of bargain
formation . . . represents an interpersonal dynamic that automatically
implicates subjective notions such as judgment, information processes,
bias, opportunism, and discretion.
Id.
173. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 20, at 39-40 ("The effect of the historical treatment of
African-Americans as property and as the subject of contracts undoubtedly has
affected the white perception and attitudes towards African-Americans and con-
tracts."). Patricia Williams has written extensively on the difference that race
makes in the contracting process. See, e.g., PATmICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY
OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
174. See Chase, supra note 20, at 65-66 ("With the changing shape of the American
economy, perhaps it is time to renew the dialogue and develop strategies that are
more appropriate for a culture whose interests, needs, and relative social posi-
tions are far more diverse than ever before. While the historical significance of
the unifying notion of race cannot be eluded, the diversity of present needs sug-
gests that a cultural perspective be employed to understand ourselves and to pre-
pare for present and future legal questions that will be far more difficult than
proving that we are human beings.").
175. As one commentator has noted, "[b]y avoiding the language-based issues of Span-
ish- and Asian-language-speaking business owners, contract law unavoidably up-
holds and endorses the pro-English norm, furthering the disempowerment of
these racial-language minorities." Lim, supra note 40, at 602-03.
[Vol. 84:506
2005] A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO CONTRACT DISPUTES 539
ences denies their existence and thus, their relevance and
importance. 176
b. The Problem of Form Agreements
Form contracts have been the subject of much discussion in past
years. Several recent developments have increased the relevance of
such a discussion. The increase in online commercial transactions and
consumer purchases of software has resulted in a rise in the use of
"shrinkwrap" and "clickwrap," or "click," agreements. Each day, more
consumers of varying ages and educational backgrounds use the In-
ternet for a wide array of important activities such as banking, invest-
ing, shopping, and paying bills. These activities are often subject to
the terms of an electronic agreement that acts as a barrier to engage-
ment. The user is required to accept the terms of the agreement or is
prohibited from proceeding further. The rapid pace of modern life has
also resulted in the acceleration of the rate at which everyday transac-
tions are completed. Consumers look for ways to minimize the time
they spend completing a transaction in order to maximize the time
they spend enjoying the fruits of that transaction. For example, a typ-
ical consumer might prefer to rapidly complete the paperwork re-
quired to rent a boat-and thus maximize the time spent enjoying the
boat-rather than spend time reading and understanding each term
in the form. A lack of enjoyment associated with the transaction-for
example, the rental of a car needed to attend a dreaded business meet-
ing-usually does not diminish the desire to complete the task as rap-
idly as possible. This desire to minimize time spent on the process of
completing a transaction has resulted in an increased dependence
upon form agreements while at the same time increasing the impor-
tance of restricting such agreements. While the consumer renting a
boat is inclined to ignore the terms of the form agreement that she is
signing in order to speed the procedural aspect of the transaction, her
failure to read enhances the likelihood that she is signing an agree-
ment that contains terms that she opposes. Even if she were to take
the time to carefully read the contract, it is unlikely that she would
have the ability to negotiate the terms of the contract, because the
party administering the contract probably lacks the authority to
change any of its provisions.
176. Id. at 603 ("The ubiquity of English in contract and market transactions is...
disempowering-it reminds language-racial minorities that English is champi-
oned as the language of American society, rendering all other languages irrele-
vant, if not objectionable . . . In sanctioning an English-only practice that
necessarily neglects the language rights of non-English speakers, contract law
thus implicitly reinforces the supremacy of the English language."); see also Mari
J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurispru-
dence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
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Other factors complicating the issue of form agreements are the
increasing globalization of commerce and the diversity of the United
States population. The increased potential for misunderstanding as a
result of cultural and linguistic differences raises questions regarding
the wisdom of using form agreements in both international and do-
mestic commercial contexts. Because form agreements contain terms
that have not been specifically negotiated, they increase the
probability of misunderstanding or miscomprehension of a word or
provision.
The application of interpretation rules to form agreements or "con-
tracts of adhesion"177 is also disconcerting. Form agreements and
standard clauses are intended to streamline the negotiation process
for both parties, but actually tend to benefit the drafter. 78 Although
some interpretation rules (i.e., judicial guidance rules) are intended to
even out the parties' bargaining positions, the more experienced
party-usually the party with more financial resources-is often able
to draft a contract so as to minimize the impact of these rules. 17 9
Todd Rakoff has questioned whether contracts of adhesion should be
enforced at all given that "[t]he great majority of form terms merely
furnish alternatives to terms that the legal system will provide to
flesh out simply stated bargains .... [MIany of the terms in typical
form documents are specifically designed to displace clear rules of law
177. The type of form agreement that is of concern here is that commonly referred to
as a "contract of adhesion." Todd Rakoff has identified seven traits of such a
contract:
(1) The document.., is a printed form that contains many terms and
clearly purports to be a contract.
(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the
transaction.
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type
represented by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter of
routine.
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation
that, except perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term),
the drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the terms con-
tained in the document. This representation may be explicit or may be
implicit in the situation, but it is understood by the adherent.
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to bar-
gaining, the document is signed by the adherent.
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type repre-
sented by the form-few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party.
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction con-
sidered as a whole is the payment of money.
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1173, 1177 (1983). With the exception of item (7), this definition applies to
my use of the phrase "form contract."
178. See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
179. Steven Bender has examined the shortcomings of existing laws intended to pro-
tect non-English speaking consumers. See Bender, supra note 134, at 1036-77.
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that would otherwise govern the transaction in question."18 0 For ex-
ample, a general rule of construction states that any ambiguous term
shall be construed against the drafter of the agreement. However, in
most jurisdictions, the drafting party is able to contract out of this
presumption by including an express provision' 8 ' in the form agree-
ment. The nondrafting party, on the other hand, usually has little or
no ability to negotiate the provisions of a form agreement.' 8 2 This is
particularly true where the transaction is between a consumer and a
commercial entity, but may also be true where both parties are com-
mercial entities.' 8 3
The parol evidence rule is another interpretation rule that has re-
ceived much scrutiny by legal scholars while receiving very little scru-
tiny by parties to a contract.' 8 4 The parol evidence rule states that
when a contract purports to be a final integrated agreement, evidence
of prior or contemporaneous written or oral agreements cannot be in-
troduced to vary the terms of the contract. Consequently, the boiler-
plate of many agreements contains a merger or integration clause that
expressly purports that the contract is the final statement of the in-
180. Rakoff, supra note 177, at 1183.
181. The following is an example of a standard provision negating the presumption
against the drafter: "This Contract will be construed in accordance with the plain
meaning of its language and neither for nor against the drafting party." This
Author has seen the following provision in many forms that claim that the agree-
ment was jointly prepared, even though that was not in fact the case: "This
agreement shall be construed without regard to the party or parties responsible
for the preparation of the same and shall be deemed as prepared jointly by the
parties hereto. Any ambiguity or uncertainty existing herein shall not be inter-
preted or construed against any party hereto."
182. Notwithstanding the weaker party's inability to negotiate standard clauses, the
agreement may nevertheless contain a provision belying that reality. It may
state, for example, "Each of the parties hereto states that it has read each of the
paragraphs of this agreement, has had the opportunity to avail itself of legal
counsel of its choice during negotiations of this agreement, and is freely and vol-
untarily entering into this agreement under no duress and that it understands
the same and understands the legal obligations thereby created."
183. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35, at 545 (proposing a theory of contract appli-
cable only to transactions between commercial entities that "can be expected to
understand how to make business contracts" and acknowledging that not all com-
mercial entities are so situated).
184. Eisenberg notes that while the parol evidence rule has not been abandoned, it
has been diminished in two ways:
First, the modern view is that the rule has no application to interpreta-
tion, and therefore does not bar evidence of negotiations prior to the mo-
ment of contract formation that bears on issues of interpretation.
Second, under modem contract law the issue under the parol evidence
rule is not the standardized issue, whether similarly situated abstract
reasonable parties would have intended a writing to supersede earlier
agreements, but the individualized issue, whether the actual parties had
that actual intention.
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1770.
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tent of the parties and that it merges all prior or contemporaneous
agreements between the parties.1 8 5 This clause is typically placed at
the end of the document with other miscellaneous provisions that may
appear to be of little consequence to the parties.' 8 6 Parties to a con-
tract, especially those not represented by counsel, may haggle over the
pricing terms but rarely bother with the boilerplate. Even if a party
questions the meaning of a particular miscellaneous provision, she
may be told that it has little significance and is "standard" or may be
given an inaccurate oral explanation. In those situations, the parol
evidence rule may bar the introduction of that oral explanation to the
detriment of the nondrafting party.
An objection might be raised that a consumer or legal entity has
the option of refusing to sign a form agreement. This choice may not
be realistic.iS17 Form agreements have become so prevalent that a per-
son who refuses to sign such an agreement would not be able to par-
ticipate in many essential commercial transactions, such as buying a
house or a car. Requested changes to a form agreement are often
flatly refused and, even if it was possible to negotiate the printed
terms, the nondrafting party might be unaware that it has the ability
to do so. Further, the cost of acquiring the information needed to un-
derstand the agreement might deter the nondrafting entity from en-
gaging in such negotiations.18 8 Finally, the market might be such
that a party might not realistically have the option of hiring counsel to
review the terms of the form agreements. The purchaser of a home,
for example, is typically asked to sign closing documents on the day of
185. The following is an example of an integration clause found in form agreements:
"This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties on the
subject hereof and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous agreements, negotia-
tions, representations and proposals, written or oral."
186. The language in the boilerplate is viewed even by sophisticated parties as unim-
portant and nonnegotiable. See generally Scott J. Burnham, How to Read a Con-
tract, 45 A iz. L. REV. 133 (2003) (discussing the general reluctance to evaluate
form contract provisions, including the boilerplate).
187. See Rakoff, supra note 177, at 1192 ("[W]hen a party of little bargaining power,
and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with lit-
tle or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an
objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms." (quoting
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965))).
188. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Eco-
nomics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 597 (1990) ("The first cost of
acquiring information concerning contract terms is the time the consumer must
spend reading the document. Because of the immense number of form contracts
the typical consumer encounters, the cumulative time investment would be con-
siderable .... The cost to the consumer is made all the more excessive by the high
cost of understanding a term's legal significance... [Clostly research is generally
required to understand the legal effect of a particular term. Obviously consumers
will not be able to undertake such research for every form they sign. Neither is it
economically viable for consumers to hire experts to interpret these documents.").
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escrow close. A first-time homebuyer may be unaware of the volume
of documents awaiting her or may be unwilling or unable to expend
the resources to hire an attorney. In many states, such as California,
the presence of an attorney is not customary at closing. Any attempt
to negotiate the terms of the closing documents is usually met with
resistance.18 9 If the buyer, for example, objects to the clause compel-
ling arbitration, she may be told that the provision is standard, that
all must agree to it, that nobody ever objects, and that any changes
will delay the closing of escrow and will result in the need to change
all the documents. Requests to change seemingly inconsequential pro-
visions may be met with suspicion or hostility. A common condition of
the offer is that the closing must occur by a particular date, so a delay
might enable the seller to keep the buyer's good faith deposit or put
the property back on the market. In areas where real estate prices
continue to skyrocket at a rapid pace, the buyer might be reluctant to
risk re-entering the competitive bidding war involved in buying a
home over distasteful boilerplate language. Consequently, the buyer
usually skims the documents, keeping an eye out only for typographi-
cal errors that might be changed on the spot without delaying the
scheduled closing.
Thus, form agreements do not reflect the ideal contracting situa-
tion contemplated by will theorists. 190 Where an individual or entity
lacks the ability to negotiate terms, her autonomy is severely lim-
ited.19 1 While she has agreed to participate in the transaction gener-
ally, she has not agreed to the particulars that define that transaction.
For example, the homebuyer-whose bargaining power is already lim-
ited in a seller's market-has agreed to purchase a house at a particu-
lar price, but has no say in whether she will arbitrate any disputes.
The best she can do is hope that a dispute situation never arises. If
the only realistic way for an individual to purchase a home is to abide
by the procedures established by the real estate industry, then she has
no choice but to sign the documents as is, with no changes, or else
forgo participation in what has been touted as the "American
dream"-home ownership. The exercise of her autonomy is confined
and the self-actualizing goals of contract law are diminished. 19 2 Form
189. This Author speaks from her experience as a third-time home buyer. At each
closing, I was informed in express terms that I had no ability to make any sub-
stantive changes and any attempt to do so would delay and, perhaps, prevent,
closing.
190. Rakoff, supra note 177, at 1235-37.
191. Sharma notes that the view of freedom of contract as exhibiting free choice and
individualism is misplaced given modern-day contracts that are often "one-sided,
often unread, and unbargained standard form contracts." Sharma, supra note
74, at 112-13.
192. Hager has noted that contract enforcement generally results in coercion, which
complicates the discussion of autonomy:
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contracts thus do not further the autonomy objective because they
often limit-not enhance-an individual's participation in
transactions. 193
Although click and shrinkwrap agreements raise the same issues
as form agreements, there is a significant distinction to be made be-
tween click or shrinkwrap agreements and other consumer form
agreements. Because of the nature of software, there are certain legal
requirements to maintain ownership on the part of the software licen-
sor. The click agreement evolved as a way to ensure that a software
user understood that she had purchased or come into possession of a
license to use the software-she did not own the software. The click
agreement was an express acknowledgment of a license, not a transfer
of ownership. The user presumes that the terms of a click agreement,
which may seem ubiquitous, are substantially the same. Her click
means that she agrees not to use the software for anything other than
its intended use. She is not agreeing to undertake any obligation
other than that. She does not expect to incur any responsibilities or to
act in an affirmative manner. In fact, if an agreement that looked like
a standard click agreement did contain terms that stated "by opening
this package, you agree to purchase the license for XXX dollars," it
would likely be deemed to be unenforceable, falling in the same cate-
gory as credit card solicitations.
Randy Barnett has argued that clickwrap and other form agree-
ments are justifiable under a consent theory. He states that "if con-
sent to be legally bound is the basis of contractual enforcement, rather
than the making of a promise, then consent to be legally bound seems
to exist objectively."194 In other words, if one clicks "I agree" to the
terms on the box of a click license agreement, "[t]here is no doubt
whatsoever that one is objectively manifesting one's assent to the
terms in the box, whether or not one has read them. The same obser-
The problem, of course, is that in contract-enforcement disputes, one
party has concluded that performance will actually contradict her well-
being. Contract enforcement therefore becomes a matter of involuntary
exchange rather than voluntary. While it may be tautologically true
that voluntary exchanges improve the well-being of both parties, the
same cannot be said of involuntary exchanges. Hence, an "efficiency"
argument for stringent contract enforcement becomes dubious. There is,
moreover, a fairness question: why should the interests of the party who
gains from enforcement be advanced at the expense of the reluctant
party?
Hager, supra note 34, at 31.
193. The amount of control that an individual feels over a transaction may be corre-
lated to a positive effect on that individual's well-being. Yuval Feldman, Control
or Security: A Therapeutic Approach to the Freedom of Contract, 18 TouRo L.
REV. 503, 532-33 (2002). Thus, a diminished sense of control would impede that
positive effect, supporting the concept that there are "therapeutic advantages of
using personally negotiated contracts and not prewritten form[s]." Id.
194. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, supra note 19, at 635.
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vation applies to signatures on form contracts." 195 Although there
may not be any doubt that the party is consenting to be legally bound,
the more pressing question is what is the party consenting to be legally
bound to do? There must be parameters to the party's consent. Bar-
nett states that a realistic interpretation of what clicking "I agree"
means is "I agree to be legally bound to (unread) terms that are not
radically unexpected." 19 6 In fact, such consent would more accurately
be only to terms that are standard for that type of agreement. A
party's expectation when viewing a click agreement (without actually
reading its terms) is that it does not deviate in any substantial way
from any other click agreement found on the Internet. 197 As Karl
Llewelyn stated:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact
been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type
of transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket as-
sent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms ...
which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.
The fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under the rea-
sonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and
only real expression of the agreement .... 198
A party realizes that clicking on the agreement requires her to re-
frain from committing certain understood acts; she would, however, be
surprised if a click meant that she was limiting her existing rights or
undertaking an onerous affirmative obligation. Thus, a party would
agree that her click meant that she agreed not to make copies of the
software, not to pirate the software, and not to sell the software. She
is not, however, agreeing to refrain from purchasing other software,
surfing the Internet, or doing any other act that she previously had
the right to do. 199 She is also not consenting to purchase the software
195. Id.
196. Id. at 637.
197. Michael Meyerson has proposed a framework for enforcing consumer form con-
tracts that he terms the "doctrine of reasonable expectations, with the focus on
the reasonable expectations of the consumer." Meyerson, supra note 188, at 611.
Meyerson argues that because "sellers can discover the reasonable expectations
of a consumer at far less cost than the reverse," such a doctrine is economically
efficient. Id.
198. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960), quoted in Home Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613,
618 (Iowa 1984).
199. As David McGowan notes, the issue of whether to apply a particular interpreta-
tion rule in the context of a clickwrap or shrinkwrap agreement often depends
upon the judge's own beliefs and presumptions. Thus, while the trade usage doc-
trine is relevant to determining the validity of shrinkwrap or clickwrap agree-
ments, the usage must be in accordance with normative goals:
[S]uppose a party claims that it is standard practice for certain types of
agreements to include punitive forfeiture provisions for nonperformance
or to pledge the promisor's first-born child as security for performance.
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(unless that is clearly set forth in a separate page where she is obli-
gated to fill out credit card information), distribute the software, or
tell others how wonderful it is, even if the terms of the agreement so
state. In other words, the terms of the agreement should not deviate
substantially from those typically found in similar agreements. The
click agreement does not take away rights previously held by the user;
it is merely setting limitations on the rights granted to the user by the
licensor.20 0 To the extent that they take liberties that extend beyond
the scope of what is expected, form and click or shrinkwrap agree-
ments are problematic even under a consent theory.
Form agreements may also undermine efficiency goals. Where a
consumer or business2ol has not reviewed and understood the provi-
sions of an agreement, it cannot be expected to have considered the
risks and costs associated with entering into the transaction. The op-
tion available to it-non-participation-would lead to market stagna-
tion if other consumers or businesses took the same position. As a
practical matter, a consumer is not likely to have the resources or the
motivation to organize a boycott of a particular product or practice re-
sulting from unhappiness over a form agreement. The argument that
the market would correct such consumer dissatisfaction is faulty in
that it ignores the realities of organizing disparate individuals who
are not affiliated in any way and have no association other than a
common desire to purchase a product. Thus, the fact that consumers
continue to sign form agreements does not reflect their willing accept-
ance of such terms, but their lack of realistic alternatives.
If proved, these practices would not count as usages on which courts
would rely in interpreting agreements. In these two examples, the pro-
posed usage would conflict with other contract rules: the prohibition on
punitive liquidated damages and the rule that courts may decline to en-
force unconscionable terms.
David McGowan, Recognizing Usages of Trade: A Case Study from Electronic
Commerce, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 167, 168 (2002). The doctrine of unconsciona-
bility, however, may be too inadequate in certain situations to guard against un-
fairness. See infra subsection III.A.2.b.i.
200. A standard provision in clickwrap agreements limits the licensor's liability for
damages caused by the software. A clickwrap agreement also typically provides
that there is no warranty provided by the licensor. The limitation of liability and
the "no warranty" provision are conditions to the grant of the license; they are not
restrictions on rights existing prior to the grant of such license. They are in-
tended to refute the presumptions implied by law in the absence of such provi-
sions. They do not require the user to either assume new obligations or to refrain
from exercising previously held rights.
201. Morant has noted that many of the issues surrounding form agreement apply
where the nondrafting party is a small business. Morant, supra note 169, at 233
("The preformed agreement, however, may also serve as an opportunistic bar-
gaining tool for the drafter. Usually drafted by the more advantaged bargainer,
the standard form may contain clauses that secure the advantaged party's expec-
tations, but also prejudice the interests of the more disadvantaged party.").
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A primary argument in favor of form agreements is that they lower
transaction costs. Todd Rakoff, for example, has acknowledged that
form contracts are beneficial to the market economy because they en-
able firms to increase their organizational efficiency 2O2 by standard-
izing terms and stabilizing the incidents of doing business, thereby
reducing transaction costs. 2 03 This efficiency argument is true, how-
ever, only: (1) for the drafting entity;204 (2) if the nondrafting party
does not hire legal counsel to review the agreement; and (3) if the non-
drafting party is a commercial entity. The contracting process be-
tween two commercial entities is often quite different from an
agreement between a consumer and a commercial entity. For exam-
ple, a corporation purchasing software may be familiar with the terms
of a form licensing agreement because it has likely engaged in similar
transactions for other divisions or operations. Furthermore, a com-
mercial entity is more likely than a consumer to have the time and
money to have legal counsel review the documents. Finally, because
the corporate entity's purchase of the software is likely to involve a
substantial amount of money and the hope of additional sales to differ-
ent divisions, the drafting party is less likely to have a "take-it-or-
leave-it" attitude and more likely to negotiate the terms of the form
agreement. The possibility of future transactions is an incentive for
the drafting party to cooperate with the nondrafting party both in de-
termining the terms of the contract and in the performance of those
terms.20 5
The software provider's cost-benefit analysis of whether to negoti-
ate a contract is different when the other party is a consumer making
a one-time software purchase. The dollar amount at stake is likely
small for the software provider, even if the amount is substantial for
the consumer. There is no possibility of sales to other divisions. The
possibility of future sales to the same consumer may not be substan-
tial enough to warrant the legal fees associated with negotiating the
terms of a contract. The software provider may not want to spend the
time to vary the standard form because such time would detract from
202. Rakoff includes among these efficiencies coordination among departments, use of
expensive managerial and legal talent, provision of a check upon the acts of sales
personnel, and maintenance of internal power structure. Rakoff, supra note 177,
at 1222-23.
203. Id. at 1220-22.
204. Sharma notes that 'the liberal fiction that all the effects of a contract should be
attributed to the will of those who made it still persists through contract law
today, even though the overwhelming majority of contracts are the product of the
will of only one of the contracting parties." Sharma, supra note 74, at 115.
205. Schwartz and Scott refer to this type of incentive as creating a "self-enforcing"
agreement because "the threat by either party no longer to deal with the other is
sufficient in and of itself to induce performance." Schwartz & Scott, supra note
35, at 557.
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other consumer sales or set a precedent that would be costly consider-
ing the low dollar amount of such sales.
Thus, the efficiency argument in favor of form agreements is one-
sided. While a standard form contract may result in costs savings for
the drafting party, the economic benefits for the other party may be
nonexistent. In particular, where the nondrafting party is a consumer
and not a commercial entity, the advantages of a form agreement are
negligible while the disadvantages are numerous. One could argue
that the consumer benefits from the software provider's lower transac-
tion cost, but this is true only if the savings are in fact passed along to
the consumer in the form of a lower retail price. The consumer has no
real freedom to contract and no real opportunity to negotiate terms.
She only has the option of either signing the agreement as is, or forgo-
ing the purchase of the software.
The interplay of contract interpretation rules with form agree-
ments often results in situations that skew to the advantage of the
party with greater resources. Assume, for example, that a software
engineer has decided to do some part-time consulting. A large
software company asks her to develop a program for a fixed fee. The
company asks her to sign their "standard consultant agreement." Be-
cause the consultant wants the business and because she does not
want to spend her savings hiring an attorney, she signs the agree-
ment. The fee is lower than market for the work she will be doing, but
she justifies the assignment as a way to get more business from the
same company. She also reasons that she can reuse some of the non-
client specific related code or routines that she develops for future
projects. 20 6 In the consulting agreement is a provision stating that
the work she creates for the company will be a "work for hire."20 7 The
206. The reuse of code and tools that does not contain client confidential information is
common in the development of the same type of program.
207. The "work for hire" doctrine arises under statute, Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000), and "work made for hire" is defined in that section as follows:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an in-
structional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work for hire.
Id. Although the statutory provision pertains to copyrights, a typical contract
expressly includes all intellectual property rights. The following is an example of
a standard "work for hire" clause in a consulting agreement:
Consultant hereby acknowledges and agrees that all worldwide rights,
title and interest in an to any work product, including any work pre-
pared by Consultant that is eligible for U.S. copyright protection or pro-
tection under the Universal Copyright Convention, the Berne Copyright
Convention and/or the Buenos Aires Copyright Convention, shall be a
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provision is very broad, granting the company exclusive rights to all
the work that will be delivered by the engineer. The software engi-
neer is not concerned about the provision because it seems that the
meaning of "work for hire" is obvious-she is creating a program (i.e.,
a work) and the company will pay her for it (i.e., for hire) and would
thus will be entitled to use it. She may not understand the legal con-
cept of "rights" as embodying not just the right to possess the media
but also the associated intellectual property rights. Even if she real-
izes that the company will have the right to make copies of the pro-
gram and the right to sell it, she may not understand that this means
that she no longer has the right to use any part of the program in any
way, shape, or form.20 8 In any event, the software company tells her
that it does not change its standard consulting agreement, that all its
consultants sign it, and if she does not, the job will just go to someone
else. The software engineer does not realize that the broad "work for
hire" provision will prevent her from using any part of the program for
any subsequent project. If she develops a template for the commis-
sioned program with the intent of reusing that template for future
projects, she will be in violation of her agreement if she in fact reuses
any part of that template, or any code, without the software company's
express consent. A common interpretation rule states that "contract
terms must be interpreted according to any special meaning given to
them by usage, and technical terms are interpreted as generally un-
derstood in the industry."20 9 As she is engaged in the software indus-
try, she may be deemed to know the industry meaning of "work for
hire" even if she lacked actual knowledge. 2 10
'work made for hire" and ownership of all copyrights and all other intel-
lectual property rights (including all renewals and extensions) shall be
the sole property of Company. In the event that any Work Product is
deemed not to be a "work made for hire" for any reason, Consultant
hereby grants, transfers and assigns to Company all worldwide rights,
title, and interest in and to the Work Product, including, without limita-
tion, all patent rights, copyrights, trade secret rights and other proprie-
tary rights therein, including all renewals and extensions thereof.
208. In my nearly ten years of practice as a lawyer in Silicon Valley, including heading
the legal department of a multinational software company, there have been
countless times when very intelligent and savvy business people and engineers
have failed to grasp the "work for hire" concept, even after much explanation.
The legal concept ran counter to their understanding of the way business was
actually conducted.
209. So. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Pac. Pipelines, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 785 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (citing CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1644, 1645 (2005)); see also Aceros Prefabri-
cados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[Ulsage of trade
is relevant not only to the interpretation of express contract terms, but may itself
constitute contract terms.") (internal punctuation omitted).
210. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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i. The Limits of the Unconscionability Doctrine
Traditionally, "the goal of contract interpretation [was] to deter-
mine the parties' actual. . . intentions."2 11 As noted in section III.A,
however, the determination of that intent can be complex and is sus-
ceptible to being compromised during the interpretive process. Thus,
the parties may have intended to enter into an agreement, but the
parameters of that agreement may be unclear or circumstances may
arise that were not contemplated by one or both of the parties. Intent,
therefore, becomes subject to certain assumptions and conditions ex-
isting both at the time of contract formation and afterward. For exam-
ple, in Patel v. Ali,212 a seller entered into a contract to sell her home.
Prior to the closing, the seller developed cancer, lost a leg, and had two
more children. In addition, her husband was sent to jail. Conse-
quently, at the time of the closing, the seller was "heavily dependent
on nearby relatives and . . . neighbors"2 13 and did not want to move.
Her reason for entering into the agreement-move to a better location,
receive cash for equity-had been subordinated by subsequent events.
Many commentators contend that social values should, and do,
play an important role in the interpretive process. 2 14 As a result of
both legislation and judicial decisions regarding contract interpreta-
tion, the twentieth century has seen court decisions shift from deter-
mining the intent of the parties to examining principles of fairness. 2 15
Because of the limits of existing contract law, however, the courts may
lack a doctrinal peg upon which to hang their decisions. A court may
be in the awkward position of having to work from a desired result
backwards to anchor the decision to a legal framework.
The unconscionability doctrine is most commonly associated with
contract law's attempt to incorporate principles ofjustice into contract
dispute resolution. The unconscionability doctrine enables a judge to
refuse to enforce a contract in order to void an "unconscionable" re-
211. Zamir, supra note 85, at 1714.
212. Patel v. Ali, [1984] 1 All E.R. 978; see also Sherwin, supra note 12, at 282-84
(discussing the case in the context of equitable defenses).
213. Sherwin, supra note 12, at 282.
214. Juliet Kostritsky states that "[tihe prior failure in the academic literature to ar-
ticulate a framework for identifying solutions that can improve social welfare in
cases of omissions stems, in part, from a failure to accept increasing social wel-
fare as the justification for legal intervention." Juliet P. Kostritsky, When Should
Contract Law Supply a Liability Rule or Term?: Framing a Principle of Unifica-
tion for Contracts, 32 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 1283, 1296 (2000).
215. Sharma, supra note 74, at 112; see also Kostritsky, supra note 214, at 1283 ("The
twentieth century has witnessed the expansion of several contracts doctrines,
such as promissory estoppel and good faith, which have involved courts in supply-
ing terms not expressly negotiated by the parties."); see generally HUGH COLLINS,
THE LAw OF CONTRACT 270-300 (4th ed. 2003) (reviewing attention to fairness in
contracting in statutory and common law).
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sult.2 16 Generally, an unconscionable agreement offends notions of
"decency,"2 17 and involves unfair surprise, grossly unfair results, or
parties who have greatly unequal bargaining power. The applicability
of unconscionability as a defense is limited because a review of the
contract is restricted to events existing at the time of formation. In
addition, unconscionability requires a high standard of unfairness.
Courts which limit their analysis to the confines of the doctrine may
end up with results that are "unfair" but that do not rise to the level of
unconscionability.2 18
Under the U.C.C., "[tihe principle is one of prevention of oppres-
sion and unfair surprise... and not of disturbance of allocation of risk
because of superior bargaining power. The basic test is whether...
the contract clause involved was so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the con-
tract."2 1 9 Many courts have adopted Arthur Corbin's test for uncon-
scionability, which examines whether the terms are "so extreme as to
appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices
of the time and place." 22 0 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
states that a bargain "is not unconscionable merely because the par-
ties to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even because the ine-
quality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party."22 1 Many
commentators have noted that the elements required to prove uncon-
scionability are vague. 2 2 2 The vagueness of the doctrine leaves the
determination of unconscionability to the discretion of the presiding
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 208 (1981); see also M.P. Ellinghaus, In
Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); John E. Murray, Jr., Un-
conscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969).
217. Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 952, 954 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
218. See, e.g., Ex parte Foster, 758 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1999) (holding that an arbitration
provision in an insurance form was not unconscionable); NEC Technologies, Inc.
v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1996) (holding a provision excluding incidental or
consequential damages in standard form for sale of television did not render
agreement unconscionable); Smith v. Harrison, 325 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa 1982) (hold-
ing that a long term farm lease for substantially less cash rent was only a "bad
bargain" and not unconscionable); Estate of Link v. Wirtz, 638 P.2d 985 (Kan.
1982) (holding that a rental for twenty year lease period was not unconscionable
even though passage of time made deal look "unfair").
219. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2004).
220. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128 (1952).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
222. Phillip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionabil-
ity, 70 U. CH. L. REV. 1513 (2003) (discussing "why after nineteen years ... legal
scholars feel that they were unable to provide courts with a 'reasoned elaboration
of what is unconscionable'" (quoting Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Con-
tract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 337 (1970))); Arthur A. Leff, Unconsciona-
bility and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967);
W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Con-
tracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 53 (1984) (noting that
"there must be hundreds of reported cases in which unconscionability is men-
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judge22 3 resulting in inconsistency of court decisions. For example,
courts in some contexts have held that mandatory arbitration clauses
are unconscionable and therefore unenforceable while others have
held that they are valid.2 24 In several notable cases, an "unfair" con-
tract was upheld because it did not rise to the level of "unconscionabil-
ity," even though there was no other vehicle for rescission. 2 25 Blake
Morant has noted that consumers are typically reluctant to plead un-
conscionability as a defense (probably because of its low success
rate),22 6 and the burden on commercial entities in proving unconscio-
nability is even higher.2 27
The power of the doctrine of unconscionability is further limited
because it is only available as a defense, and not as a source of affirm-
ative relief.228 Thus, it cannot be used as a mechanism for seeking
damages. Relying upon the doctrine of unconscionability is not only
limited in its practical application-it is problematic from a theoreti-
cal perspective, as well. The doctrine of unconscionability is used to
rescind a contract, meaning that the contract has already been
deemed to exist. In many cases, however, the very issue to be resolved
is whether a contract existed at all or, if it does exist, what it means.
Under the unconscionability doctrine, it is established that a contract
was in fact made and that the provisions mean what the non-re-
scinding party says, but the contract must nonetheless be nullified in
order to save the weaker party from its own actions. 229 Thus, the un-
tioned, but its meaning is no clearer now than it was before the Code was
enacted").
223. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004) (enabling a judge to exercise his or her discretion in
determining unconscionability as a "matter of law").
224. See Ex parte Foster, 758 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1999) (holding the arbitration provision
in an insurance form was not unconscionable). But cf. Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Serv., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000) (holding that absent a "modi-
cum of bilaterality," it is "unfairly one-sided" for an employer with superior bar-
gaining power to impose arbitration on employees).
225. Patel v. Ali, [1984] 1 All E.R. 978 (although refusing to allow specific perform-
ance, also refusing to rescind the contract); see also supra note 218 and accompa-
nying text.
226. Morant, supra note 169, at 266. Morant observes that "[i]f consumers seldom
obtain relief from an unconscionability plea, it logically follows that non-con-
sumer parties, such as businesses that are generally deemed more sophisticated
than consumers, would garner even less success with the defense." Id.
227. Id.
228. See Sanders v. Colonial Bank of Am., 551 So. 2d 1045 (Ala. 1989) (per curiam);
Cal. Grocers Ass'n, Inc. v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that CAL. Crv. CODE § 1670.5(a) (2005) phrases the doctrine in defensive
terms and does not create an affirmative cause of action).
229. As Chase notes, the case most often used in law school textbooks to illustrate the
doctrine of unconscionability is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1965), which involved African-American consumers. Chase
states that because unconscionability cases typically involve the use of psycholog-
ical pressure to exert influence over those who are "irresolute, feeble, or weak,"
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conscionability doctrine is paternalistic, inflicting psychic damage
upon those it seeks to protect precisely by granting them such protec-
tion.230 Further, because it is used only as a defense, it fails to pro-
vide a means by which bargaining parties can empower themselves
and maximize the "individual autonomy" objective of contract law. A
party who is able to get out of a contract by claiming unconscionability
is appealing to the benevolence of an individual judge. The doctrine
does not "further the will of the parties" because it is used solely as a
defense, not as a means through which an agreement is enforced. The
shortcomings inherent in the unconscionability doctrine do not require
that the doctrine be abolished but suggest that there should be an-
other means by which parties can enforce (or defend against) a form
contract that does not reflect what they thought they had agreed to.
The unconscionability doctrine serves its purpose of providing
judges a means to nullify otherwise valid agreements for reasons of
public policy. There are many circumstances, however, where an
agreement does not rise to the level of unconscionability yet does not
conform with social norms of fairness in bargaining. Furthermore,
many disputes arise not because a party wants to rescind a contract
on fairness grounds, but because the parties disagree as to the mean-
ing of a particular provision. In other words, it is unlikely that a party
would enter into an agreement with the intent of later seeking rescis-
sion on grounds of unconscionability. In most cases, the parties have
entered into the contract with the intent of performance, but later dis-
cover that each party has a different interpretation of one or more pro-
visions that alter the performance required under the contract.
Finally, even if the contract reflects the intent of the parties at the
time of formation, circumstances may arise which change either the
nature of the contract or a party's ability to perform, as illustrated by
the Patel case. Most courts, and the U.C.C., require that the condi-
tions of unconscionability exist at the time the contract was made. 2 3 1
Therefore, the unconscionability doctrine may be inapplicable because
the unfair circumstances did not exist at the time the contract was
entered into. This is true despite changed circumstances that could
lead to unforeseen hardship for one party. A dynamic approach would
the widespread use of Walker-Thomas has the effect of "equating Afri-
can-Americans with the 'irresolute, feeble, or weak.'" Chase, supra note 20, at
39.
230. Id. As Chase observes, Walker-Thomas implies that "the condition of blackness
creates a need for protection by the paternalistic white power structure." Id.; see
also id. at 57 (discussing the implication in the case that "African-Americans as a
group are to be protected from their own inability to make decisions").
231. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1977) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract .... ").
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require the consideration of such changed circumstances in determin-
ing enforcement of the agreement or the remedy for breach thereof.
IV. A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
This Part examines how a dynamic approach to contract interpre-
tation should be applied. Section IV.A examines three cases involving
at least one changing business practice discussed in Part III, and at
least one interpretation rule. While these courts purported to apply
an interpretation rule to reach their respective results, the courts in
fact used the interpretation rule to justify, rather than to guide, its
decision. This section then analyzes the facts of each case, using a
dynamic approach in its application of the interpretation rules. Sec-
tion IV.B provides guidelines for using contract interpretation rules in
a dynamic fashion.
A. A Dynamic Analysis of Three Cases
1. Use of Custom and the Creation of Business Norms
In Cunningham Packing Corp. v. Florence Beef Co.,232 the plaintiff
seller sued the defendant buyer after the buyer rejected the seller's
shipment of beef. Under the sales agreement, Cunningham agreed to
sell to Florence four loads of Australian boneless beef, guaranteed to
be "85% chemical lean."233 That day, Cunningham sent to Florence
four identical Sales Confirmation Orders, one for each of the four
loads.234 The following was typed on each order: "THIS ORDER
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS OF SALE ON FACE AND REVERSE
SIDE HEREOF."235 Further, "[oln the reverse side, under the Condi-
tions of Sale," was the following:
In the event Buyer claims product covered by this contract is less than the
chemical leanness specified in this contract, Seller has the right to arrange
independent testing. Should the product test less than the guaranteed chemi-
cal leanness, Seller will allow for excessive fat content based on selling price,
and Buyer will accept such as full settlement.2 3 6
Between the time when the beef was ordered and received, "the
price of beef had fallen and it continued to fall."237 After receiving the
shipments, the beef was tested for "chemical leanness," and "[tlhe re-
sults showed the loads to be 83.86%, 81.54%, 81.74% and 80.96%."238
"Florence notified Cunningham of the test results," and two other lab-
232. 785 F.2d 348 (lst Cir. 1986).
233. Id. at 349.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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oratories retested the beef, determining that it was "84.7%, 83.25%,
83.6%, and 83.5% chemical lean."2 39
The packing company then "recognized that the beef delivered did
not fully satisfy the contract requirement of 85% chemical lean" and
notified Florence that it would credit its account for the price adjust-
ment as set forth in the "Guidelines for the Settlement of Fat Claims"
published by the Meat Importers Council of America.2 40
The court permitted the plaintiff seller to introduce evidence that
it was the custom in the meat industry for the seller to reduce the
purchase price when testing revealed that the meat shipped did not
satisfy contract specifications. It did not, however, permit the defen-
dant buyer to introduce expert testimony to establish that there was a
custom in the trade that the Guidelines did not apply if the beef was
not originally processed and shipped as per the contract's specifica-
tions.24 1 The court cited the general rule of contract interpretation
that evidence of custom and usage is relevant to contract interpreta-
tion.2 42 The court noted that Massachusetts law provided that "the
express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or
usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable, express
terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade."2 4 3 The court
reasoned that because "the express terms on the Sales Confirmation
Orders called for the buyer to accept as 'full settlement' an allowance
for excessive fat content based on the selling price," the proffered testi-
mony was not consistent with the express terms and was properly
excluded. 2 44
Several concerns are raised by the court's conclusion. First, the
"express terms" referred to by the court were contained in the Sales
Confirmation Orders, presumably forms created by defendant Cun-
ningham. The "express terms" were on the reverse in the printed lan-
guage under the "Conditions of Sale."245 One could reasonably argue
that the terms contained on the back of a printed order confirmation
were not the "express terms" contemplated by the Massachusetts leg-
islature in that they were not negotiated or acknowledged by the par-
ties. 24 6 It could also be argued that the proposed testimony was not
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 351.
242. Id. at 351; see also Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th
Cir. 1981).
243. Cunningham Packing, 785 F.2d at 351.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 350.
246. In fact, the notes accompanying the statute indicate the contrary as they state
that the policy objective underlying Massachusetts General Laws chapter 106
section 1-205 is the same as that underlying sections 1-203 and 2-302. Section 1-
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inconsistent with the express terms, because they could reasonably be
construed as meaning that the Buyer could receive a partial or full
refund but could not sue Seller for lost profits or consequential dam-
ages. The court stated that the Sales Confirmation Orders called for
the buyer to accept as "full settlement" an allowance for excessive fat
content, but the Order did not indicate what that allowance had to be.
Nowhere in the Order was it stated that the buyer was barred from
seeking a full, instead of a partial, refund. It is not clear that the une-
quivocal meaning of the words "Seller will allow for excessive fat con-
tent based upon selling price and Buyer will accept such as full
settlement" was "Seller will reduce the purchase price pursuant to the
Guidelines promulgated by the Meat Importers Council and Buyer
must agree to such Guidelines and cannot return the goods for a full
refund."
The defendant buyer also appealed on the grounds that the lower
court improperly used the parol evidence rule to justify the exclusion
of the evidence. The court of appeals noted that:
Among the many evidentiary rulings the trial court made rejecting evidence
Florence offered, one finds a number of instances in which the ruling could
conceivably have been based upon the parol evidence rule .... Although the
record contains some language that might suggest the trial court relied on the
parol evidence rule, as a whole the record demonstrates that the trial court's
main concern was with relevance, lack of foundation and possible jury
confusion. 2
4 7
Both the lower court and the court of appeals rejected the defen-
dant's attempted use of custom and trade usage to enforce a norm of
ethical business conduct. From the time that the defendant placed the
order and the time it was delivered, the price of beef had fallen. 248
203 provides an obligation of good faith in contract performance or enforcement.
Section 2-302 provides as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause or it may so limit the appli-
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
MAss. GEN. LAwS ch. 106, § 2-302.
247. Cunningham Packing, 785 F.2d at 351.
248. Although statistics for beef imports from Australia from December 1979 to Janu-
ary 1980 were not available, the following statistics demonstrate a significant
increase in beef prices generally during this time:
Market price for slaughter steer via Nebraska Direct (Choice 2-4;
1100-13001bs)
December 1979 - $68.55
January 1980 - $66.10
Market price for slaughter steer via Omaha (Choice 2-4; 1100-1300 lbs)
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Shortly after receiving the loads, Florence had them tested. The re-
sults of that testing revealed the chemical leanness of the beef to be
83.86%, 81.54%, 81.74%, and 80.96%. When two different laboratories
again tested the beef, the averaged results were 84.7%, 83.25%, 83.6%,
and 83.5% chemical lean. The disparity between the results of the
tests conducted at the request of Florence and those conducted by the
two independent laboratories seems to indicate that the defendant
was acting in bad faith in an attempt to get out of an agreement that
would result in it paying more than the then-current market price.
By contrast, the plaintiff seller appeared to be acting fairly and
ethically. When confronted with the test results, Cunningham offered
to reduce the purchase price pursuant to industry guidelines. The
court permitted the introduction of the Guidelines to establish custom
on the basis that they, unlike the defendant's evidence, could "reason-
ably be construed as consistent with the express terms."24 9
The court was enforcing a norm of business conduct by refusing to
permit the defendant to rely upon a technical breach to avoid a con-
tract that would be less profitable given prevailing market conditions.
Unfortunately, it hid this laudable goal behind the guise of an even-
handed application of interpretation rules. The court would likely
have reached a different conclusion if the defendant's motivation was
less suspect-if the price of beef had risen, for example. Perhaps most
troubling is the court's exclusion of expert testimony on the basis that
it was inconsistent with the express terms on the back of the Sales
Confirmation Orders. Given the one-sidedness of printed order confir-
mation slips, the court may be establishing a dangerous precedent in
relying upon their terms to exclude testimony that would establish
custom.
A dynamic approach might reach the same conclusion, but with a
different analysis. First, the court would need to determine what the
parties intended. The intent of the parties may be determined by
their words or their conduct prior to, during, and after contract forma-
tion. The touchstone for intent is that the parties act honestly and in
good faith. There is no legal or policy related reason for enforcing con-
tractual intent made dishonestly or in bad faith.
December 1979 - $67.78
January 1980 - $66.32
Market price for slaughter steer via Texas (Choice 2-4; 1100-1300 lbs)
December 1979 - $69.66
January 1980 - $67.17
Market price for slaughter heifer via Omaha (Choice 2-4; 1000-1200 lbs)
December 1979 - $66.50
January 1980 - $61.30
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Livestock Prices, available at http://usda.mannlib.cor-
nell.edu/data-setslivestock/94006/livestocklprices.xls (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
249. Cunningham Packing, 785 F.2d at 351.
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Next, a dynamic approach would consider any circumstances that
might justify an outcome that does not enforce the intent of the par-
ties. These circumstances would include the broader societal effect of
enforcement, such as the impact on business or social policy. It would
also consider the normative effect ofjudicial decisions and the philoso-
phy that the law should not only reflect the expectations and conduct
of the parties, but influence them. 25 0
In this case, the central point of inquiry would be: "What did the
parties intend when they entered into an agreement to buy/sell beef
guaranteed to be eighty-five percent chemical lean?" Did they mean
that any percentage below eighty-five would be insufficient? The an-
swer might seem simple-ask the buyer. In this case, however, there
are reasons why the buyer might answer dishonestly. The price of
beef had fallen substantially during the time between contract forma-
tion and the time of rejection. Furthermore, Florence's independent
test results differed from the subsequent test results by a significant
percentage-which might lead to the conclusion that Florence was
seeking to escape its contractual obligations through dishonest means.
If, however, Florence had presented credible evidence supporting
its contention that the beef had to be no less than eighty-five percent
chemically lean, the result regarding intent would be different. For
example, evidence that Florence had contracted with McDonalds for
the sale of no less than eighty-five percent chemically lean beef would
lend credibility to its position.
The second part of a dynamic analysis would consider broader soci-
etal and policy implications. In this case, the beef was being shipped
from Australia. Shipments of beef from Australia are typically trans-
ported by boat and take several weeks. Because of the duration of
time involved, permitting buyers to reject shipments of Australian
beef without good cause would create a one-sided advantage in favor of
United States buyers who would benefit from market fluctuations.
The Australian supplier, on the other hand, would have incurred sub-
stantial shipping expenses and lost opportunity costs. Consequently,
Australian beef suppliers would be less inclined to conduct business
with United States buyers, resulting in harm to the United States beef
industry in particular, and to United States trade in general. Fur-
thermore, because the plaintiff Cunningham was willing to pay for the
price differential between eighty-five percent chemical lean beef and
the beef that was actually supplied, Florence would likely not have
suffered any financial harm.
The court in Cunningham Packing Corp. mentioned the rise in beef
prices and the disparity in testing values without directly invoking the
relevance of these factors in its analysis. Instead, the court referred to
250. See Sunstein, supra note 73, at 1135-39; West, supra note 73, at 675.
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the terms on the back of the Sales Confirmation Orders in order to
exclude the defendant's expert testimony regarding custom. If the
facts had been different, it seems unlikely that the court would have
accorded those terms the same weight. For example, if Florence had
entered into an agreement with a third party to supply eighty-five per-
cent chemically lean beef, the court may have been more amenable to
permitting the expert testimony or it might have reached a different
conclusion regarding the "express" nature of the terms on the order
confirmations.
2. The Normative Agenda Behind a "More Reasonable"
Interpretation of Chicken
The well-known case of Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l
Sales Corp.2 5 1 also involves international trade and misunderstand-
ing. In Frigaliment, the plaintiff, a Swiss corporation, entered into
two contracts with defendant for the purchase of "chicken."2 52 At is-
sue was whether defendant had breached by shipping stewing hens
instead of young chickens for broiling and frying.2 53 The first con-
tract, dated May 2, 1957, confirmed the sale of
US Fresh Frozen Chicken, Grade A, Government Inspected, Eviscerated 2 1/-3
lbs and 1 'h-2lbs each all chicken individually wrapped in cryovac, packed in
secured fiber cartons or wooden boxes, suitable for export
75,000 lbs. 2 'h-3lbs... $33.00
25,000 lbs. 1 'h-2lbs. . . $36.00
per 100lbs FAS New York
scheduled May 10, 1957... 254
The second contract, also dated May 2, 1957, was identical except
that only 50,000 pounds of the heavier chicken were called for, the
price of the smaller birds was $37 per 100 pounds, and shipment was
scheduled for May 30. When the initial shipment arrived in Switzer-
land, plaintiff discovered that the young chickens were stewing chick-
ens or "fowl." On May 28, plaintiff sent two cables complaining that
the larger birds in the first shipment were "fowl."2 55 The defendant
refused to recognize plaintiffs objection and sent a cable announcing,
"We have ready for shipment 50,000 lbs. chicken 2 'h-3, 25,000 lbs.
broilers 1 1/2-21bs.," and asked for an immediate answer "whether we
are to ship this merchandise to you and whether you will accept the
merchandise." 2 56 There were several more cable exchanges until
plaintiff replied on May 29,
251. 190 F. Supp. 116 (D.C.N.Y. 1960).
252. Id. at 117.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 120.
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[clonfirm again that merchandise is to be shipped since resold by us if not
enough pursuant to contract chickens are shipped the missing quantity is to
be shipped within ten days stop we resold to our customers pursuant to your
contract chickens grade A you have to deliver us said merchandise we again
state that we shall make you fully responsible for all resulting costs. 2 5 7
The plaintiff buyer stated that although the initial cables between
the parties were predominantly in German, they used the English
word "chicken" and not the German word "Huhn." Plaintiff buyer
claimed that the use of the English word "chicken" was intended to
mean only young chickens rather than the more inclusive German
word "Huhn," which included both broilers and stewing chickens. 2 58
The plaintiff also contended that there was a definite trade usage that
"chicken" meant "young chicken."
The court engaged in a dynamic analysis when it noted that be-
cause the defendant had only started in the poultry trade, he was
within the principle that "when one of the parties is not a member of the trade
or other circle, his acceptance of the standard must be made to appear by pro-
viding either that he had actual knowledge of the usage or that the usage is so
generally known in the community that his actual individual knowledge of it
may be inferred."
2 5 9
The court seemed to question the sincerity of the plaintiffs belief that
the larger chickens meant broilers and fryers when, at the time of
contract
the price for 2 lh-3lbs broilers was between 35 and 37 cents per pound, and
that when defendant entered into the contracts, it was well aware of this and
intended to fill them by supplying fowl in these weights. [Defendant] claims
that plaintiff must likewise have known the market...260
The court concluded that the defendant believed that it could com-
ply with the contract by delivering stewing chickens in the 2 1h to 3
pound size. The court noted that the defendant's subjective intent
would not be significant if this did not coincide with an objective meaning of
'chicken.' Here it did coincide with one of the dictionary meanings, with the
definition of the Department of Agriculture Regulations.. .with at least some
usage in the trade, with the realities of the market, and with what plaintiffs
spokesman had said.2 6 1
The court glossed over the plaintiffs intent,2 6 2 stating that the "plain-
tiff has the burden of showing that 'chicken' was used in the narrower
257. Id.
258. The court disregarded this argument based upon defendant's testimony that
when he asked plaintiffs agent "what kind of chickens were wanted, received the
answer, 'any kind of chicken,' and then in German, asked whether the cable
meant 'Huhn' and received an affirmative response." Id. at 118.
259. Id. at 119 (quoting 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2464 (4th ed. 1940)).
260. Id. at 120.
261. Id. at 121.
262. But see Sanchez, supra note 134, at 663-65 (discussing Frigaliment as an exam-
ple of a presumably good faith linguistic error based on a cultural
misunderstanding).
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rather than in the broader sense." The court's dynamic analysis, how-
ever, contradicted its purported reliance upon the "objective" meaning
of the word "chicken." The court acknowledged the good faith of the
defendant's intent, while expressing doubt about the nature of the
plaintiffs interpretation:
It is scarcely an answer to say, as plaintiff does in its brief, that the 33 cents
price offered by the 2 1h-3 lbs 'chickens' was closer to the prevailing 35 cents
price for broilers than to the 30 cents at which defendant procured fowl.
Plaintiff must have expected defendant to make some profit-certainly it
could not have expected defendant deliberately to incur a loss.2 6 3
Finally, even if the plaintiff, in good faith, misunderstood the de-
fendant's interpretation of the word "chicken," the exchange of cables
after the delivery of the first shipment should have made clear the
miscommunication. The court, by dismissing the complaint, indicated
that it would not enforce a contract where both parties, subsequent to
formation, realized the basis for the contract was a misunderstanding.
In this case, enforcement would have resulted in defendant sustaining
a loss of between two to four cents per pound, plus shipping costs.
Rather than concluding that the defendant's interpretation of chicken
prevailed because it was "broader," a more appropriate justification
for its decision would have been that business norms favored nonen-
forcement of the contract.
3. Ambiguity and Form Agreements--Justifying Policy with
Rules
In Castle v. Caldera,264 the plaintiff was an Army officer who
sought a declaration that the Army's denial of his resignation request
was unlawful. The Army filed a motion for summary judgment that
the plaintiff was required to complete his active duty service
obligation.
In 1995, Castle applied for a program in the army which enabled
him to attend advanced schooling at the Army's expense. As part of
the enrollment process, he signed a Statement of Service Obligation
("SSO"). The SSO contained the following provision:
1. In accordance with Chapter 10, para 10-3(2), AR 351-3, I understand that
by participating in the [Program], I will incur an active duty obligation
(ADSO) of three times the length of the education or training for the first year
of [sic] portion thereof. Participation for periods of education or training in
excess of 1 year will result in an ADSO of three times the length of the train-
ing, until a maximum of six years is incurred. This adso [sic] commences upon
completion or termination of my education/training. All provisions of AR 351-
3 apply.2 6 5
The third paragraph stated:
263. Frigaliment, 190 F. Supp. at 120.
264. 74 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 1999).
265. Id. at 6.
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3. I understand that in the event I voluntarily withdraw, or as a result of
misconduct, fail to complete the required ADSO, I will reimburse the United
States the cost of advance education, which includes tuition, books, supplies,
and other costs clearly identified as paid by the United States, IAW paw 10-2,
AR 351-3. This does not include pay allowances, or travel expenses.2 6 6
Castle argued that he understood paragraph 3 to mean that he
could voluntarily withdraw from his ADSO at any time as long as he
reimbursed the Army for the cost of his education. 26 7 The Army, on
the other hand, argued that the first paragraph clearly stated that the
plaintiff, by participating in the program, would "incur an active duty
obligation."268 In addition, the Army argued the last sentence of para-
graph 1 incorporated by reference the provisions of AR 351-3; section
10.2 of AR 351-3 provides that a resignation or request from active
duty "will not be favorably considered except . . .when in the best
interest of the Government and under applicable law."26 9
In response, Castle countered that the relationship between
paragraphs 3 and 1 was ambiguous and that the agreement could be
reasonably interpreted as requiring only that the plaintiff reimburse
the Army for educational expenses in order to resign.2 70
The court framed the issue as "whether the SSO itself 'admits of
only one reasonable interpretation' such that there is no genuine issue
of material fact as to its meaning."271 In determining this issue, the
court stated that the "standard mode of contract interpretation not
only presumes that the 'reasonable person knows all the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the contract,' but it also requires
that a 'reasonable person [be] bound by all usages which either party
knows or has reason to know."' 2 72 The court then concluded that "the
only reasonable interpretation of the SSO" was that the plaintiff had
no right "to buy out his service obligation."2 73
The court's conclusion is surprising given that the defendant's mo-
tion was for summary judgment. As the court noted, summary judg-
ment is proper if all the pleadings and other documents show that
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."27 4 The court pur-
ported to use an objective standard of interpretation in reviewing the
SSO, yet a reading of paragraph 3 of the SSO supports the plaintiffs
claim of ambiguity. A reasonable person could infer that the phrase,
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 16.
270. Id.
271. Id. (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 473 (D.C.
Cir. 1993)).
272. Id. at 11 (quoting Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. Dist. of Colum., 443 A.2d 29, 32
(D.C. 1982)).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 10.
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"I understand that in the event I voluntarily withdraw... I will reim-
burse the United States..." means voluntary withdrawal is an option
provided there is reimbursement. The paragraph does not explicitly
prohibit voluntary withdrawals after enrollment in the Program
which would make the purported meaning much clearer, nor does it
expressly state that since voluntary withdrawals are not permitted
that such withdrawals would constitute desertion. Interestingly, the
court failed to apply the common interpretation presumption in favor
of the nondrafting party and against the drafting party-in this case,
the United States Army.
A closer look at the court's decision reveals that it selectively ap-
plied interpretation rules, not because there was no genuine issue of
material fact, but for policy reasons. The court referred to the DA
Form 3838 in the first few paragraphs of its opinion. That form con-
tained the following statement:
I understand and agree that if selected for training any tender of resignation
or request for release from active duty on my part will be disapproved until
the total period of obligated active service is completed, except for the conve-
nience of the Government or in case of extreme compassionate circumstances
I understand that my service obligation will be computed in accordance with
AR 351-3.275
The DA Form 3838 was part of the application for the program but
was never signed by the plaintiff or an Army representative. The
court lamented that "[tihis action may never have been commenced
had the Army obtained plaintiffs signature on DA Form 3838, which
provides in the plainest of terms" that the plaintiff is not permitted to
resign until the completion of the period of obligated service.2 76 It
bemoaned the fact that "that did not happen, nor does the SSO con-
tain the Obligatory Statement's unmistakable admonition. The door
to this litigation thus opened." 27 7 The court appeared rueful that due
to what it considered an administrative error, the active service obli-
gation of the SSO was put into question.
The court noted that the Army was "severely understaffed in posi-
tions requiring officers with plaintiffs education and skills"278 and
that plaintiff was scheduled to assist in "major renovations planned
for the 121st Evacuation Hospital" in Korea.2 79 Furthermore, his ab-
sence "could degrade the current climate of health care in the region
for all soldiers there, and ultimately affect the readiness of the force in
that region."28 0 The court hid behind a purported objective interpre-
275. Id. at 6.
276. Id. at 10.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 7.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 7-8.
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tation of the contract in order to render an opinion based upon policy
favoring the Army. As the court stated in its conclusion, "[gliven the
shortage of officers with plaintiffs attributes and training, the Army
understandably concluded that it could not afford to allow Major Cas-
tle to renege on his obligation to put to work in the Army's service the
new skills he had acquired at the Army's expense." 281
A dynamic approach to contract interpretation would strive first to
ascertain what the parties intended by entering into the agreement.
More specifically, did they intend for Castle's enrollment into the pro-
gram to mean that he should be unable to terminate his active duty
obligation for any reason whatsoever?
The Army, having a policy and a history behind the program, can
easily establish its intent. In determining Castle's intent, however,
the court must address the threshold issues of whether he acted hon-
estly and in good faith. In other words, was he lying when he claimed
that he thought he could avoid his active duty obligation by reimburs-
ing the Army? Under a dynamic approach, the standard is not what a
"reasonable" person would have thought, but what Castle actually
thought.
In this case, the court seemed to doubt Castle's honesty and good
faith:
Plaintiff is an officer on active duty in the United States Army where he has
spent his entire career. Indeed, plaintiff is by all accounts an intelligent,
highly-educated, and well-trained military officer. He has an enviable record
of academic achievement, having earned a bachelor's degree, a master's de-
gree, and is now on the verge of a [sic] earning a doctoral degree. When plain-
tiff tendered his resignation, he stated that he 'understood that this
resignation, if accepted, will be accepted under Honorable conditions'.... The
'if accepted' caveat reveals at least some recognition by plaintiff that he did
not have a right to extinguish unilaterally his active duty obligation. There is
certainly no evidence that any Army officer ever told plaintiff, or that he relied
on any representation, that he could pay his way out of his ADSO.2 8 2
The court continued:
The Program was created 'to provide medical and dental manpower for the all-
volunteer Army' and 'was not a scholarship program designed to benefit the
public at large .... Plaintiff instead claims that he reasonably understood the
SSO to mean that the Army promised to send him to Harvard, to cover all of
his expenses, to continue to disburse his military salary, and that in return,
he promised only to reimburse all educational expenses should he have second
thoughts about fulfilling his side of the bargain. 2 8 3
The court failed, however, to consider other relevant aspects sup-
porting plaintiffs stated intent. As previously noted, the provisions of
paragraph 1 and 3 are ambiguous at best, and arguably inconsistent if
read as intended by the Army. Furthermore, the court's reliance on
281. Id. at 13.
282. Id. at 12.
283. Id.
564 [Vol. 84:506
2005] A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO CONTRACT DISPUTES 565
the incorporation by reference of AR 351-3 in the SOS unfairly bur-
dened Castle. This type of incorporation by reference raises the same
issues of fairness raised by fine print boilerplate in form agreements.
The court also failed to consider circumstances arising after con-
tract formation that might have affected the analysis of the plaintiffs
intent in entering into the agreement. The court noted the harm to
the Army that could occur if the plaintiff was relieved of his active
duty obligation; however, it only mentioned in passing the reasons for
the plaintiffs resignation, which included "hardships that extended
military services had imposed on his family and particularly his wife's
ability to provide their children with a 'proper Jewish upbringing and
Hebrew schooling."'284 Given that Castle's new orders required him
to be stationed in Korea, it would appear that the hardships to his
family would have been compounded. The court spent a great deal of
time discussing and rationalizing the Army's policy but completely
disregarded the implications of that policy on Castle's family or his
right to freedom of religion, nor did it discuss the sticky issues of invol-
untary servitude which were thereby raised. A dynamic analysis
might not necessarily have resulted in a different outcome, but it
would have forced the court to openly address and weigh the policy
considerations underlying its decision.
B. Guidelines for a Dynamic Approach to Contract
Interpretation
A dynamic approach to contract interpretation strives to effectuate
the intent of the parties. In many cases, however, the intent of the
parties is not readily determinable and courts must resort to interpre-
tation rules. This section suggests how the four categories of interpre-
tation rules discussed in section III.A. should be applied using a
dynamic approach.
1. Definitional Rules of Interpretation
Definitional rules of interpretation should be used only to deter-
mine what the parties meant when they said what they said (or wrote
what they wrote). Because they should be applied only to discern the
meaning of the words as used by the contracting parties, the courts
should use them only to help uncover the subjective intent of the par-
ties-not the objective meaning of the words. They may, however, be
used to assist in the determination of whether the parties' stated in-
tent was in fact that party's actual, honest intent. In other words, def-
initional rules may be helpful in determining the veracity of the
parties' stated understanding of a word or phrase. For example, as-
sume X enters into a contract with Y whereby X agrees to pay Y "fifty
284. Id. at 7.
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dollars" to mow X's lawn. Assume that Y mows X's lawn and X states
that by "fifty dollars" she meant fifty "Monopoly" dollars, whereas Y
assumed she meant fifty "U.S." dollars. The courts should apply rele-
vant definitional rules of interpretation to determine the credibility of
X's understanding-Xs actual and honest understanding-instead of
simply accepting X's claimed understanding. Thus, the court could de-
termine that the "generally prevailing"28 5 meaning of the word "dol-
lars" means U.S. dollars, not Monopoly dollars. The applicability of
the definitional rules of interpretation should not be a foregone con-
clusion, however. For example, if X and Y were mother and daughter,
and X has in the past paid Y in Monopoly money (which she can later
redeem for special privileges, such as staying up late or driving the
family car), the definitional rules should not apply. In other words,
the court should not follow the "generally prevailing meaning" of the
word "dollars" to subvert the actual intent of the parties.
2. Gap Fillers
Where parties have omitted a relevant term, a dynamic approach
would avoid implying terms that the parties would not have agreed to
themselves. If the parties to a contract intentionally avoided address-
ing a particular issue in the contract because they were unable to
reach a resolution and considered the possibility of that issue arising
an unlikely event, the courts should not intervene to provide that
term. For example, assume X enters into a contract to supply
software and services to Y. The parties agree to the number of
software licenses, the price, and the scope of the services. They disa-
gree, however, as to what happens in the event that service level
targets are not met. Because they assume that the likelihood of X not
meeting those targets is low-and because X needs to close the deal
before the end of the quarter-they execute the contract and agree to
resolve the issue at a later date. If a disagreement subsequently
arises regarding the service level targets, the court should not inter-
vene by providing a term to which the parties had not agreed. On the
other hand, a gap filler could be used if the court determines that it is
one that the parties would have agreed to had they considered the
relevant issue. For example, assume that X and Y entered into the
above mentioned agreement, but failed to even consider the issue of
service level targets. In that case, the court should supply a gap filler
that assumes industry norm averages unless the parties introduce evi-
dence that they had not intended to resort to industry norms. This
might be the case if, for example, X were a start-up and had agreed to
provide software and services at a price far below the industry aver-
age. In that case, Y might have understood that X could not perform
285. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(a) (1981).
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in accordance with industry standards yet considered the lower price
an acceptable trade-off for the subpar service; this might also be the
case if, for example, Y had its own software services group and entered
into the agreement with X primarily because it desired Xs software.
3. Evidentiary Rules
Formalistic evidentiary rules, such as the parol evidence rule and
the four corners rule, should not be used under a dynamic approach.
These rules were created to limit the admissibility of evidence. Yet,
there is no compelling reason why contract disputes should be subject
to special evidentiary rules. Although there may be some cases where
using evidentiary rules of contract interpretation may enhance the re-
liability of the evidence, there are usually other ways to attain the
same objective, namely by applying the rules generally applicable to
the admissibility of evidence. Evidentiary rules may also unfairly im-
pact minorities because they assume that both parties share the same
linguistic and cultural context, which is often by default assumed to be
the majority language and culture. Evidentiary rules thus ignore the
significance of preexisting relationships and nonverbal communica-
tion and wrongly assume linguistic certainty. 28 6 As discussed in Part
III, parties with access to lawyers are often aware of these evidentiary
rules and thus can plan accordingly, while those with limited re-
sources and limited access to lawyers may be unaware of these nonin-
tuitive, formalistic evidentiary rules. Consequently, these rules may
be subject to misuse. For example, assume X buys a car from Y. Prior
to signing the agreement, X asks Y whether the car will come with air-
conditioning. Assume further that X is a native Spanish speaker. Y
tells X, in Spanish, that the car comes with air conditioning. X signs
the contract, even though there is in bold, large letters, a provision
stating that the vehicle does not come equipped with air conditioning.
The parol evidence rule should not be used to bar evidence of the con-
versation between X and Y.
4. Judicial Guidance Rules
Some of the same concerns with the use of evidentiary rules of in-
terpretation are raised by the use of judicial guidance rules. Because
they are not intuitive, judicial guidance rules have the potential to
unfairly advantage the savvier party, the one who knows the "rules of
the game." Unlike evidentiary rules, however, judicial guidance rules
reflect a policy objective. Thus, while they should not be applied auto-
matically, the underlying policy objective should be taken into consid-
eration in determining their applicability in any given case. For
example, the presumption favoring the nondrafting party assumes
286. See generally supra subsection III.A.2.
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that the drafting party was, at contract formation, in the best position
to resolve language ambiguities. Generally, this would be true since it
can be assumed that a party understands the terms in its standard
contract. But this may not be true in all cases. Assume that X is a
small business owner who, due to limited resources, uses the same
form agreement for every transaction, even though each transaction
differs in some material way. X cannot have her lawyer review every
contract that she signs due to budgetary constraints. Assume that the
nondrafting party, Y, is a large corporation. Y requests modifications
to X's standard form contract, stating that X must incorporate the pro-
visions as they are nonnegotiable, "standard" terms for Y. While the
modifications are technically still "drafted" by X, the presumption
should no longer be applicable.
On the other hand, assume that the parties execute Ys standard
form agreement. Y has in-house legal counsel who must approve
every agreement entered into by the sales department. It can be as-
sumed that Y has read and understood the terms in its standard form
agreement and the presumption should apply.
V. CONCLUSION
Ideally, interpretation rules serve an important function in filling
gaps in contracts. In practice, they often create assumptions that one
or both parties never intended. For some, the interpretation rules are
guidelines that serve to increase a party's comfort level that in the
event of a dispute, the contract will not be subject to the wholly subjec-
tive whims of the judge or jury.28 For others, the rules only add to
the uncertainty and complexity of a transaction. Their existence may
function as a secret "code" that keeps out nonmembers by requiring
contracting parties to engage lawyers to decipher the meaning of
words that should be knowable. Individuals without the money to
spend on legal fees are at a disadvantage during the negotiation pro-
cess and others may refrain from entering into transactions
altogether.
Contract rules of interpretation should not be applied automati-
cally in every situation involving a contract dispute. In this Article, I
have proposed guidelines for a dynamic application of interpretation
rules. In applying any rule of interpretation, the determination of the
intent of the parties should be the primary objective. Generally, rules
of contract interpretation that are more intuitive 28 8 will assist in this
endeavor while those that are more formalistic and procedural will
287. Of course, the determination of whether a rule is "intuitive" for a party would
require consideration of the cultural and linguistic frames of reference for that
party.
288. But, as David McGowan notes, a review of shrink-wrap licensing cases shows
that:
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not. There should then be consideration of any underlying or conflict-
ing policy considerations. Thus, as a general matter, because eviden-
tiary rules are less intuitive and more formalistic, they have no role in
a dynamic analysis. Judicial guidance rules, which are often policy-
based, should be applied if the underlying policy objective of the par-
ticular rule is promoted in a given case. Gap fillers and definitional
rules should be applied to the extent that they shed light on the credi-
bility of the parties and the veracity of their stated intent; however,
they should not be used where their underlying purpose is to uphold a
norm to which the parties have not agreed (or would likely, not have
agreed).
A commonly accepted objective of contract law is the enforcement
of the intention of the parties with certain limitations. An under-
standing of those intentions requires an understanding of the parties'
background-in other words, the experiential and intellectual frame-
work from which they are operating. The rise in global commerce, the
increased use of the Internet and the concomitant use of click agree-
ments, and the increasing diversity of the United States population
require that formalistic rules of contract interpretation (in particular,
evidentiary rules) described in Part III, be approached dynamically.
The intention of a party in signing a contract may be affected by her
understanding of its validity, its purpose and the words on the page.
In some cases, form is substance in that it affects the likelihood that
the terms have not even been read.
A dynamic approach considers the various issues and policy goals
affected by the application of interpretation rules.28 9 On one hand, a
[A] judge's own beliefs and presumptions affect the decision whether to
recognize a usage of trade ... judges became more willing to accept post-
order shrink wrap terms as a method of forming an agreement as they
either became more familiar with that method or came to accept eco-
nomic arguments used to justify recognition of that method.
McGowan, supra note 199, at 169.
289. As Reimann notes, comparative law scholars may be ahead of contract law in
recognizing the importance of a dynamic approach:
[W]e have learned to look beyond legal systems and families as static
and isolated entities. Conscious of their historic contingency and ongo-
ing development, we have come to think, in a more dynamic fashion, pri-
marily of legal traditions .... Comparative law has also come to look at
the world in terms of coexisting legal cultures, i.e., as parts of larger so-
cial structures consisting of economies, religions, social habits,
etc ..... We realize that we need to consider rules in context, i.e., at least
within the existent procedural and institutional frameworks, and, if we
want to grasp their deeper meanings, also within their socio-economic
and cultural environments. And we know that we must observe not only
the law on paper but also the law in action, i.e., the application and in-
terpretation of rules and their true force and effect including, perhaps,
their impotence.
Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second
Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 Am. J. COMP. L. 671, 677-79 (2002).
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party to a contract requires some certainty that a transaction will not
be undone simply because a term was omitted or the other party mis-
understood the meaning of a word or provision. On the other hand,
the court should consider the broader societal and policy implications
of its decision. In fact, many interpretation rules were intended to
promote policy goals of social and moral fairness. 2 90 In some cases,
however, the interpretation rules may work against the interests of
justice if strictly or uniformly applied to a given type of contract, with-
out considering other relevant factors such as the experiences of the
parties or the presentation of the contractual terms.
Often courts reference an interpretation rule but misapply it in or-
der to avoid a particular result. A dynamic approach provides a doc-
trinal peg upon which to hang a decision. More importantly, it frames
the discussion and analysis of issues relevant in a given case within
the larger societal context.
290. Zamir, supra note 85, at 1725-26, 1749 (stating that insurance policies are gener-
ally interpreted in favor of the insured). But see Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900
P.2d 619 (Cal. 1995) (denying plaintiffs recovery for noneconomic damages under
a commercial general liability policy).
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